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
 
The Big Data revolution is upon us. Technological advances in the 
degree to which third parties can record information about individuals, 
along with increases in the use of predictive analytics, are transforming 
the way that business is conducted in practically all sectors of the 
economy. This is particularly true in the insurance industry, where a 
firm’s ability to forecast the future is the central determinant of its 
profitability. 
Scholars and the media have touted the potential benefits of Big Data 
analytics—it will enable businesses to tailor their practices to suit 
consumers’ preferences and increase the efficiency of their operations. 
The Big Data movement’s potential negative impacts, however, have 
garnered significantly less attention. Commentators have focused on 
privacy and data security concerns as the primary problems associated 
with Big Data analytics. There have been essentially no attempts to assess 
how these developments affect consumers’ other interests or, more 
broadly, the extent to which they justify additional regulation of markets. 
This Article fills this gap. It identifies eight societal interests that will 
be affected by insurers’ uses of data—actuarial fairness, loss prevention, 
autonomy, non-discrimination, justice, utility maximization, privacy, and 
good faith—and describes how regulators could act to ensure that markets 
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generate an optimal balance of these values. While laissez-faire 
regulatory approaches are superior for some types of insurance, more 
extensive state interventions are needed for products that are sold to 
individual consumers. Where additional regulation is needed, community 
rating rules, authorization requirements for policy modifications, and 
claims handling standards are the mechanisms best suited to guaranteeing 
that insurance markets continue to advance public interests in the Big 
Data era.  
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INTRODUCTION  
The Big Data revolution is upon us. Technological advances in data 
collection and storage, along with increases in the use of predictive 
analytics, are transforming the way that business is conducted in all 
sectors of the economy.
1
 Much attention has been given to the benefits that 
Big Data analytics will generate; it will provide businesses with insights 
about their customers, enabling them to tailor their practices to better 
satisfy consumers and identify ways to increase the efficiency of their 
operations.
2
 The negative impact that this movement could have on 
consumers, however, is still being explored. Governmental bodies and 
scholars have primarily focused on the privacy and data security problems 
presented by businesses’ use of Big Data analytics.3 This Article is one of 
 
 
 1. See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT 
WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 123–49 (2013) (describing the effects that Big 
Data and predictive analytics are having on commerce); ERIC SIEGEL, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS: THE 
POWER TO PREDICT WHO WILL CLICK, BUY, LIE, OR DIE 17–35 (2013) (same); JAMES MANYIKA ET 
AL., MCKINSEY & CO., BIG DATA: THE NEXT FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND 
PRODUCTIVITY (2011), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Business%20Funct 
ions/Business%20Technology/Our%20Insights/Big%20data%20The%20next%20frontier%20for%20i
nnovation/MGI_big_data_full_report.ashx, archived at https://perma.cc/89XZ-PDWY (“Big Data . . . 
is now part of every sector and function of the global economy.”); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, 
Privacy in the Age of Big Data: A Time for Big Decisions, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 63–65 (2012) 
(“Data has become the raw material of production, a new source of immense economic and social 
value.”); Jonathan Gordon et al., Big Data, Analytics, and the Future of Marketing and Sales, FORBES 
(June 22, 2013, 9:13 AM), http://onforb.es/15Zjisz (“Big Data is the biggest game-changing 
opportunity for marketing and sales since the Internet went mainstream almost 20 years ago.”); Claire 
Cain Miller, The Numbers of Our Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2013, at ED18 (describing data science 
as a “hot new field” that “promises to revolutionalize industries from business to government, health 
care to academia”). 
 2. See COLIN WHITE, BI RESEARCH, USING BIG DATA FOR SMARTER DECISION MAKING 
(2011), available at ftp://public.dhe.ibm.com/software/tw/Using_Big_Data_for_Smarter_Decision-
Making_v.pdf (providing an overview of business uses of Big Data); Justin Brookman, Protecting 
Privacy in an Era of Weakening Regulation, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 355 (2015); Omer Tene & 
Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. 
& INTELL. PROP. 239, 243–44, 249–51 (2013) (discussing business benefits of big data); Tene & 
Polonetsky, supra note 1, at 63–65 (same); David J. Walton, Technology: How Exactly Are Businesses 
Using Big Data?, INSIDE COUNSEL (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/03/ 
14/technology-how-exactly-are-businesses-using-big-da, archived at https://perma.cc/AB24-KTLH 
(“[C]ompanies are using big data to identify new customers, advertise more effectively, and develop 
new products and services.”); A Special Report on Managing Information: Data, Data Everywhere, 
THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 2010, at 71 (providing an overview of business uses of Big Data). 
 3. See, e.g., Big Data and Consumer Privacy in the Internet Economy, 79 Fed. Reg. 32,714 
(June 6, 2014); Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to 
Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 96–109 (2014) (discussing privacy harms 
associated with the use of predictive analytics); Benjamin Zhu, Note, A Traditional Tort for a Modern 
Threat: Applying the Intrusion Upon Seclusion to Dataveillance Observations, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
2381 (2014); Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 2, at 251–56 (discussing Big Data-related privacy and 
security problems); Adam Frank, A Brave New World: Big Data’s Big Dangers, NPR (June 11, 2013, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the first comprehensive assessments of how these developments threaten 
the public’s interests within a specific market. It also describes how 
regulation could address these problems.  
While the use of Big Data in any industry has the potential to bring 
about these harms, this Article focuses on analyzing how the data 
revolution will affect insurance markets.
4
 Insurers, always interested in 
refining their predictive capabilities, have been aggressively integrating 
Big Data methodologies into their business operations.
5
 Auto insurers have 
begun to directly monitor policyholders’ driving practices and use this 
information to calibrate personalized premium rates.
6
 Many casualty 
insurers are using data culled from social networking sites to inform their 
sales, advertising, and product development practices.
7
 Some companies 
have gone as far as scrutinizing individuals’ actions on social networking 
websites and their other online activities to evaluate the likelihood that 
policyholders’ claims are fraudulent.8 
 
 
2:41 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/13.7/2013/06/10/190516689/a-brave-new-world-big-datas-big-
dangers (discussing privacy harms associated with the use of predictive analytics). 
 4. For other scholarly discussions of Big Data’s potential effects on insurance markets, see 
Peter Siegelman, Information & Equilibrium in Insurance Markets with Big Data, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 
317 (2014); Rick Swedloff, Risk Classification’s Big Data (R)evolution, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 339 
(2014). 
 5. See EARNIX & INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., 2013 INSURANCE PREDICTIVE MODELING SURVEY 6 
(2013) (presenting data about insurance companies’ uses of Big Data); PETER CORBETT ET AL., IBM 
INST. FOR BUS. VALUE, ANALYTICS: THE REAL-WORLD USE OF BIG DATA IN INSURANCE 1–3 (2013) 
(describing how insurers are using Big Data); Peggy Brinkmann & Nancy Watkins, Why Big Data Is a 
Big Deal, INSURANCE ERM, Summer 2013, at 28, available at http://www.milliman.com/ 
uploadedFiles/insight/2013/big-data.pdf (reviewing data establishing the pervasive use of analytics in 
the insurance industry); Nathan Conz, Insurers Shift to Customer-focused Predictive Analytics 
Technologies, INS. & TECH. (Sept. 2, 2008, 2:15 PM), http://www.insurancetech.com/business-
intelligence/insurers-shift-to-customer-focused-predi/2106002.71, archived at https://perma.cc/5KDN-
HCJ3 (describing how insurers are using Big Data). 
 6. See SAS INST. INC., TELEMATICS: HOW BIG DATA IS TRANSFORMING THE AUTO INSURANCE 
INDUSTRY 1 (2013) (describing telematics as “a technology that will revolutionize the entire 
automobile insurance industry”); Randall Stross, Are You a Good Driver? Let’s Go to the Monitor, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2012, at BU3 (describing how auto insurers are incorporating telematic devices 
into their operations); Clint Boulton, Auto Insurers Bank on Big Data to Drive New Business, WALL 
ST. J. (Feb. 20, 2013, 5:03 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2013/02/20/auto-insurers-bank-on-big-data-
to-drive-new-business/ (same). 
 7. See CORBETT ET AL., supra note 5, at 5 (stating that nearly half of insurers analyze social 
media for business purposes); EARNIX & INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 5, at 11 (same). 
 8. See Mohan Babu & Soumya Chattopadhyay, Claims Fraud: A Big Opportunity for Big Data 
& Analytics, CLAIMS J. (July 29, 2013), http://www.claimsjournal.com/news/national/2013/07/29/ 
233805.htm, archived at https://perma.cc/2GYL-K6P7 (“Thus, throughout the claims management 
lifecycle insurers can keep receiving live data feeds, such as blogs, tweets and social media posts and 
scrutinize them along with their sentiments to ascertain the veracity of the claim on an ongoing 
basis.”); Young Ha, In Few Years, Social Network Data May Be Used in Underwriting, INS. J. (Oct. 
13, 2011), www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2011/10/13/219764.htm, archived at https://perma. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss4/5
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The combination of recent developments in data science and insurers’ 
existing predictive analytics practices has the potential to catalyze 
incredible advances in efficiency and innovation, creating tangible benefits 
for consumers and providers alike. But it also poses substantial threats to 
consumer welfare. Many of these dangers are common to all commercial 
uses of Big Data: aggregating large amounts of personal data increases the 
magnitude of security breach losses;
9
 compiling information from a large 
number of sources makes it less likely that individuals’ consent-based 
constraints on the use of their information will be respected;
10
 and using 
data mining to inform sales, pricing, or employment decisions increases 
the likelihood that companies will violate anti-discrimination laws.
11
 
These issues, however, assume greater significance in the context of 
insurance markets. One standard response to these concerns—that market 
forces will punish companies that abuse Big Data analytics—has less force 
in insurance markets due to the high degree of uniformity across 
insurers.
12
 Additionally, the necessary and non-substitutable nature of 
many insurance products prevents individuals from being able to 
completely withdraw from consumer insurance markets.
13
  
 
 
cc/4TXY-77MR (“Already, scouring Facebook and other social network pages of the insureds is a 
common practice on the claims side of the business.”). 
 9. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE WHITE HOUSE, BIG DATA: SEIZING 
OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES 51 (2014) [hereinafter BIG DATA REPORT I] (“Amalgamating 
so much information about consumers makes data breaches more consequential . . . .”); Michael 
Murphy & John Barton, From a Sea of Data to Actionable Insights: Big Data and What It Means for 
Lawyers, 26 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 8, 12–13 (2014) (describing data security failures); Sasha 
Romanosky et al., Empirical Analysis of Data Breach Litigation, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 74, 
74–75 (2014) (describing the magnitude of losses from recent data security breaches). 
 10. See Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the Misuse of Personal 
Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 140, 143–44 (2006) (discussing the rise in the improper use of data by 
commercial entities); Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 
2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 368–72 (describing how commercial entities have misused individuals’ 
personal data).  
 11. BIG DATA REPORT I, supra note 9, at 7, 51–53 (describing how companies’ uses of Big Data 
can violate anti-discrimination laws); Crawford & Schultz, supra note 3, at 99–101 (same); Murphy & 
Barton, supra note 9, at 13–14 (same); Eileen Sullivan, Discrimation Potential Seen in ‘Big Data’ Use, 
YAHOO! FINANCE (Apr. 26, 2014, 2:20 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/discrimination-potential-
seen-big-data-144748436.html (same). 
 12. See INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., ISO: ENHANCING COMPETITION IN THE WORLD’S INSURANCE 
MARKETS (1999), reprinted in KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 33–34 (3d ed. 2000) (describing why insurance policies typically contain identical 
terms); cf. Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263, 
1263–65 (2011) (demonstrating that claims of standardization are overblown in the context of 
homeowner’s policies). 
 13. See Alan N. Gamse, Understanding the Safety Net Provided by Property and Casualty 
Insurance Guaranty Associations, 40 THE BRIEF 34, 34 (2010) (“In today’s world, many types of 
property and casualty insurance coverages are considered a necessity rather than a luxury.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Insurance markets possess certain characteristics that will cause 
insurers’ embrace of Big Data analytics to threaten public interests. 
Competitive pressures and the increased availability of data will inevitably 
lead the industry to begin collecting and analyzing massive amounts of 
information about applicants’ social and commercial behaviors. Having 
one’s ability to obtain insurance depend on the degree to which their 
behaviors fall within certain parameters imposes market mechanisms on 
individuals’ personal lives in potentially objectionable ways. At its most 
extreme, it would grant insurers the power to effectively compel 
individuals to take actions or force them to waive their rights.
14
 In addition 
to endangering individual autonomy, allowing insurance companies to 
analyze this type of information would injure societal commitments to 
justice and equality.
15
 It would convert insurance from a mechanism that 
mitigates the advantages and disadvantages that people have due to luck 
into a mechanism that exacerbates them.
16
 Finally, permitting insurers to 
use data in this way would destroy individuals’ privacy interests, generate 
patterns of behavior that do not maximize societal utility, and injure good 
faith contractual norms.
17
  
State actors appear to be unaware of many of these problems.
18
 Neither 
state governments nor the federal government have implemented rules that 
restrict insurers from integrating Big Data methodologies into their core 
operations. For the vast majority of lines of insurance, there is essentially 
nothing limiting the amount of data that insurers can collect about 
individuals and very little controlling their use of consumers’ personal 
information.
19
 
Designing regulations to address these issues is complicated by the fact 
that allowing insurers to conduct these types of analyses would benefit 
consumers in certain ways and harm them in others. Ideally, regulatory 
measures would permit insurers to use analytics to the extent that the 
associated welfare gains outweigh losses. Identifying this threshold 
requires a regulator to identify the different types of interests that will be 
 
 
 14. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 15. See infra Parts II.C.2–3. 
 16. See infra Part II.C.3. 
 17. See infra Part II.C.4. 
 18. But see infra Part III.C.1 (describing recent actions by federal actors that indicate their 
interests in this issue). 
 19. See BIG DATA REPORT I, supra note 9, at 39–47 (discussing general commercial uses of Big 
Data and the current lack of regulations addressing potentially abusive practices); CORBETT ET AL., 
supra note 5, at 3–6 (discussing all the different types of information insurers can collect and how they 
can use that data). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss4/5
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affected by insurers’ practices and make a normative judgment about their 
relative importance.  
In this context, a regulator would have to weigh the gains associated 
with increases in actuarial fairness and risk reduction against the injury to 
autonomy, anti-discrimination, equality, utility maximization, privacy, and 
good faith norms. Analyzing the regulatory problem through this rubric 
shows that a laissez-faire approach is merited when it comes to insurers’ 
uses of data in commercial lines of insurance. The state, however, must 
take an active role in regulating policies marketed to individual 
consumers. In order to be effective, regulation of consumer insurance 
markets will have to address how insurers may use data when performing 
underwriting, rate setting, policy construction, and claims management 
functions. The ideal regulatory mechanisms for constraining insurers’ 
behaviors in these areas are community rating rules, authorization 
requirements for policy modifications, and claims handling standards. 
These approaches provide frameworks that can be tailored to effectuate 
different conceptions of the ideal balance of public values.  
This Article proceeds as follows: After providing background 
information on the influence that Big Data and predictive analytics are 
having on commercial activities in Part I, Part II of this Article discusses 
the impact that these changes will have in insurance markets. More 
specifically, it will describe how allowing insurers to have unrestrained 
access to and use of consumer data would improve actuarial fairness and 
resolve several problems in insurance markets, but would injure a number 
of other societal interests. Part III concludes by providing an overview of 
the current state of insurance regulation, discussing the normative goals 
that regulators should pursue, and outlining the types of regulation that are 
best suited to achieving these goals.  
I. BIG DATA AND PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS IN THE COMMERCIAL SPHERE  
In order to discuss the regulatory challenges that will result from 
insurers expanding their data analysis capabilities, a certain amount of 
background information about the larger Big Data movement is necessary. 
Technological advances and changes in society have set the stage for the 
emergence of commercial data markets and have created an environment 
where companies can use (or build upon their use of) predictive analytics. 
In practically every commercial sector, businesses have rapidly adopted 
data-driven practices in the hopes of improving their competiveness. 
These innovations, however, have not been costless, and consumers are 
rapidly learning of the dangers these advances have created. This Part 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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describes the developments that laid the foundation for these changes and 
provides a snapshot of how Big Data has already changed business 
practices and consumer risks.  
A. Defining Big Data and Predictive Analytics  
Before reviewing the developments underlying the Big Data movement 
and discussing how these changes have affected commercial markets, a 
few fundamental terms must be defined. Even though the public 
consciousness has become inundated with references to “Big Data” and 
“predictive analytics,” many remain uncertain about each term’s 
meaning.
20
 The public’s confusion about these terms is understandable 
given the different (and often inconsistent) ways the concepts have been 
used in popular media and trade publications.
21
 
Predictive analytics is the easier of the two concepts to define. In its 
most general sense, the term refers to the use of “statistical and analytical 
techniques . . . to develop models that predict future events.”22 Predictions 
about what is likely to happen are generated by first calculating how 
different qualities have been correlated with each other in the past and then 
using these correlations to make projections about what is likely to happen 
in the future.
23
 In some sense predictive analytics is an ancient field—it 
has existed for as long as humans have used information about past events 
to prognosticate about the future.
24
 The meaning of the phrase has evolved, 
however, and today it almost exclusively refers to predictions that result 
from sophisticated technological analyses of large data sets. In commercial 
contexts, predictive analytics has been defined as the efforts of businesses 
to make sense of Big Data and gain insights that will provide competitive 
advantages over their peers.
25
 
 
 
 20. See Svetlana Sicular, Gartner’s Big Data Definition Consists of Three Parts, Not to Be 
Confused with Three “V”s, FORBES (Mar. 27, 2013, 8:00 AM), available at http://onforb.es/103sM27 
(discussing confusion over the definition of Big Data). 
 21. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 1, at 6 (discussing the evolution of the 
term and stating that there “is no rigorous definition of Big Data”); Woodrow Hartzog & Evan 
Selinger, Big Data in Small Hands, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 81, 81 n.1 (2013) (noting the lack of 
consensus about the meaning of Big Data). 
 22. See CHARLES NYCE, AM. INST. FOR CPCU/INS. INST. OF AM., PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS 
WHITE PAPER, at 1 (2007). 
 23. See, e.g., SCOTT PATTERSON, THE QUANTS: HOW A NEW BREED OF MATH WHIZZES 
CONQUERED WALL STREET AND NEARLY DESTROYED IT 31, 45 (2010) (discussing the basic 
framework of analytics). 
 24. For a popular account of the evolution of risk prediction and early forms of insurance, see 
PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK (1998). 
 25. See THOMAS H. DAVENPORT & JINHO KIM, KEEPING UP WITH THE QUANTS: YOUR GUIDE TO 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss4/5
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What distinguishes Big Data from regular data? Unfortunately, a 
consensus has yet to emerge regarding the defining qualities of Big Data.
26
 
A number of definitions have been set forth in industry documents, 
popular media, and academic circles.
27
 The most basic attempts to describe 
the distinguishing characteristics of Big Data analytics note that the 
information being analyzed is extremely large in size and is gathered from 
a variety of sources.
28
 Indeed, the source that is most commonly cited on 
this issue associates the Big Data designation with three qualities of the 
data being analyzed: volume (the amount of data), velocity (the rate at 
which data is generated), and variety (the types of data collected).
29
 
While definitions of Big Data that focus on data characteristics may 
have intuitive appeal to laymen, scholars have criticized them for failing to 
draw attention to what actually distinguishes analytics based on Big Data 
from those that use traditional sets of data. According to these critics, a 
definition cannot accurately describe the phenomenon if it focuses on the 
qualities of the data being analyzed and fails to reference the methods used 
to aggregate and analyze the data.
30
 As one pair of commentators put it, 
“Big Data is less about data that is big than it is about a capacity to search, 
aggregate, and cross-reference large data sets.”31 Under such definitions, 
the amount of data is not necessarily significant—for instance, a single 
database containing all of the United States’ historical census data would 
not be considered Big Data in isolation, but could qualify if combined with 
other sets of data. What makes a collection of information qualify as Big 
Data is the fact that it requires the use of technologies that can analyze 
data that are not centrally located, are not stored in a uniform format, and 
are incomplete.
32
  
 
 
UNDERSTANDING AND USING ANALYTICS 1–2 (2013). 
 26. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 1, at 6 (“There is no rigorous definition of 
Big Data.”); Lisa Arthur, What Is Big Data?, FORBES (Aug. 15, 2013, 8:17 AM), 
http://onforb.es/127cyYm (discussing disagreement over the term’s meaning). 
 27. See JONATHAN STUART WARD & ADAM BARKER, UNDEFINED BY DATA: A SURVEY OF BIG 
DATA DEFINITIONS 1–2 (2013), available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1309.5821 (describing several 
definitions of Big Data). 
 28. Id. at 1; see also MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 1, at 1. 
 29. See WARD & BARKER, supra note 27, at 1; Big Data: What It Is & Why It Matters, SAS, 
http://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/big-data/what-is-big-data.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2015) (“As far 
back as 2001, industry analyst Doug Laney (currently with Gartner) articulated the now mainstream 
definition of big data as the three Vs of big data: volume, velocity and variety.”). 
 30. See WARD & BARKER, supra note 27, at 2. 
 31. Danah Boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations for a Cultural, 
Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 662, 663 (2012). 
 32. See, e.g., JEAN-PIERRE DIJCKS, ORACLE, BIG DATA FOR THE ENTERPRISE 2–4 (2012). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Because the analysis contained in the remainder of this Article does not 
rely on a specific conception of Big Data, selecting among these 
definitions is unnecessary. However, to the extent that doing so helps 
clarify matters, it adopts the definition proposed by Ward and Barker, 
which references both data characteristics and process—“Big data is a 
term describing the storage and analysis of large and or complex data sets 
using a series of techniques including, but not limited to: NoSQL, 
MapReduce and machine learning.”33 Later Parts will demonstrate how 
expansions in the quantity of data available to private entities and 
advances in analytic technologies—that is, the Big Data movement—have 
created an environment where insurers and other private entities can wield 
unprecedented levels of power over consumers.  
B. The Data Revolution and the Datafication of Commerce  
Now that Big Data and predictive analytics have been defined, it is 
possible to review how these concepts have been operationalized by 
businesses. Given the novelty of Big Data-informed analytics, the public is 
largely unaware of the rapid growth of the data industry and the extent to 
which individuals’ personal information has become a commodity that is 
transferred among private and public entities. Even more significantly, the 
average person has little understanding of exactly how much information 
about herself is being collected by third parties or how private companies 
and the government have begun to use this data. 
The most natural starting point for a discussion of this industry is 
identification of the types of information that constitute the Big Data that 
companies are collecting, analyzing, buying, and selling. One primary 
source of data is, unsurprisingly, the Internet. Businesses have created 
huge banks of data by recording the online actions of individuals. These 
sets of data typically contain information about individuals’ “transactions, 
email, video, images, clickstream, logs, search queries, health records, and 
social networking interactions.”34 Second, companies have gathered and 
compiled individuals’ personal information from a variety of offline 
sources: public records (e.g., criminal records, deeds, corporate filings), 
retailer’s sales records, credit agencies, etc.35 Finally, entities are 
 
 
 33. WARD & BARKER, supra note 27, at 2. NoSQL, MapReduce, and machine learning are all 
techniques that enable the analysis of data that are not centrally located, do not share the same format, 
and may be incomplete. Id. at 1–2. 
 34. Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 2, at 240. 
 35. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 1, at 99–100 (“Specialized data brokers in 
the United States . . . charge handsomely for comprehensive dossiers of personal information on 
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collecting incredible amounts of information from the ever-growing 
number of devices that have the capacity to record and transmit 
information about the world. This last category is unquestionably the 
broadest of the three and encompasses information generated by cell 
phones, surveillance cameras, global positioning satellites, utility-related 
sensors, communication networks, and phonebooths, among other 
sources.
36
 
Nearly every business and governmental entity collects information 
that is (or could be) used in Big Data analytics. Many of the most obvious 
examples of this are in the technology sector, where businesses like 
Google and Facebook have been publicly criticized for failing to provide 
sufficient disclaimers about how the companies record individuals’ 
actions.
37
 Many brick-and-mortar and online retailers, however, have been 
just as aggressive in amassing information about their customers. 
Technology has enabled them to permanently save information about 
consumers’ browsing behaviors and sales records.38 Additionally, telecom 
companies, financial services businesses, health care providers, and 
governmental entities record an inconceivably large amount of data every 
day.
39
 Due to the nature of Big Data analytics, essentially any entity that 
collects and retains information about its operations can be thought of as a 
data aggregator. 
While a few companies (e.g., Google) have both the technical expertise 
and data needed to perform Big Data-style analyses wholly internally, 
 
 
hundreds of millions of customers.”); Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 404–05 (2014) (“To obtain their information, data brokers search through 
government records, purchase histories, social media posts, and hundreds of other available sources.”); 
see also generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY (2014), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-
brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databroke 
rreport.pdf. 
 36. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE WHITE HOUSE, REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT—BIG DATA AND PRIVACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 22–24 (2014) [hereinafter 
BIG DATA REPORT II] (describing the explosion of data collection devices in the modern era); 
MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 1, at 1–2 (same); Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 2, at 40–41 (same). 
 37. See Facebook and Privacy: Sorry, Friends, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 3, 2011, at 74; Privacy 
and the Internet: Lives of Others, THE ECONOMIST, May 22, 2010, at 71–72; David Streitfeld, Google 
Concedes Drive-By Prying Violated Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2013, at A1.  
 38. Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to 
Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 64–66 (2003); Retail Technology: We Snoop to 
Conquer, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 9, 2013, at 82; Stephanie Rosenbloom, In Bid to Sway Sales, 
Cameras Track Shoppers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2010, at A1. 
 39. See generally BIG DATA REPORT I, supra note 9, at 22–47 (listing examples of private 
entities’ data collection efforts); BIG DATA REPORT II, supra note 36, at 11–17 (same). 
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most companies cannot.
40
 These companies must instead purchase access 
to data and data analysis services from third parties. Access to data can be 
obtained either by entering into agreements with companies that specialize 
in second-order data aggregation—that is, the collection and centralization 
of information from public and private primary sources—or by purchasing 
access to relevant data sets that other first-order aggregators possess.
41
 
Data analysis services are available from traditional analytics companies 
like IBM and Cisco, as well as a host of smaller upstarts.
42
 Over time the 
dichotomy between data aggregators and analytics businesses has begun to 
break down, with an increasing number of companies offering both types 
of services.
43
 
Private entities have expressed interest in employing Big Data analytics 
in a variety of ways. A recent survey of businesses revealed that 
companies are either interested in using or are currently using Big Data 
methodologies to perform the following functions: trends/pattern analysis; 
regulatory compliance; fraud detection and prevention; predictive analysis 
and modeling; incident prediction; geo-correlation; sentiment analysis; 
diagnostic and medical uses; and others.
44
 While the potential for analytics 
to help organizations achieve their goals is nothing new, the breakthroughs 
underlying the Big Data movement—the increased availability of 
information and the ability to analyze unstructured data—have drastically 
expanded the number of economically feasible applications.
45
 
Examples of how the private sector has already begun to use Big Data-
powered predictive analytics are legion. Marketing and advertising 
 
 
 40. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 1, at 124–27, 132 (describing the 
development of data brokering and data analysis markets). 
 41. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 1, at 124–27, 132; EARNIX & INS. SERVS. 
OFFICE, INC., supra note 5, at 16 (presenting data about the number of insurers that purchase data from 
third party vendors); Lois Beckett, Everything We Know About What Data Brokers Know About You, 
PROPUBLICA (June 13, 2014, 12:59 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/everything-we-know-
about-what-data-brokers-know-about-you, archived at https://perma.cc/S9FG-RMSS (discussing the 
collection and sales practices of data brokers). 
 42. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 1, at 127–28. 
 43. Id. at 131–32. 
 44. See AIIM, BIG DATA AND CONTENT ANALYTICS: MEASURING THE ROI 9 (2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/M5KY-496K (collecting companies’ responses to questions about the types of analysis 
they would like to do or already do). 
 45. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 1, at 8–9 (describing the explosion in the 
amount of data gathered); NYCE, supra note 22, at 2 (“Advances in computer hardware and software 
design have yielded software packages that quickly perform . . . calculations, allowing insurers to 
efficiently analyze the data that produce and validate their predictive models.”); John Bantleman, The 
Big Cost of Big Data, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2012, 1:21 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/cioc 
entral/2012/04/16/the-big-cost-of-big-data/#27a89476a21a (describing the technological developments 
that have made Big Data analytics accessible to businesses). 
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applications have been particularly popular, with organizations hiring 
traditional consulting companies like McKinsey or newcomers like 
eXelate to analyze their data and increase the effectiveness of customer 
outreach and retention efforts.
46
 Other organizations have been employing 
Big Data methodologies to improve the core services that they provide. 
For example, Vree Health, a subsidiary of Merck & Co., Inc., has started 
analyzing patient data provided by primary health care providers as well as 
information gathered from online sources to identify factors that predict 
whether patients are likely to be readmitted for treatment.
47
 The results of 
Vree’s analyses give health care providers knowledge that they can use to 
improve their practices and reduce costly readmissions.
48
 
Of course, the expansion of Big Data analytics has not been limited to 
the private sector. A growing number of public entities have turned 
towards predictive analytics with hopes that it can help enhance their 
operations. For example, one public education system has partnered with 
IBM to create an algorithm that estimates the likelihood students will drop 
out prior to graduation based on information culled from schools’ 
academic and administrative records, as well as demographic information 
like students’ race, gender, and socioeconomic status.49 The school system 
plans to use this information to help it identify high-risk students before 
they stop attending school.
50
 Another example is the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s use of predictive analytics to police securities-
related fraud and other illegal behaviors.
51
 In addition to collecting its own 
data, the agency has utilized data brokers to access databases containing 
vast amounts of individuals’ personal information, which the agency 
mines to discover indicia of illegal conduct.
52
 
 
 
 46. See CORBETT ET AL., supra note 5, at 1–5; Gordon et al., supra note 1. 
 47. See CTR. FOR INFO. POL’Y LEADERSHIP, BIG DATA AND ANALYTICS: SEEKING FOUNDATIONS 
FOR EFFECTIVE PRIVACY GUIDANCE 4–7 (2013). 
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. at 6–8. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Rachel E. Barkow, The New Policing of Business Crime, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 435, 450–
51 (2014) (providing an overview of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Big Data initiatives); 
Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Enforcement Initiatives to Combat Financial 
Reporting and Microcap Fraud and Enhance Risk Analysis (July 2, 2013), available at http://www.sec. 
gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171624975#.U97aOqhFH6c (announcing the creation 
of the Center for Risk and Quantitative Analytics). 
 52. See JAY STANLEY, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE SURVEILLANCE-INDUSTRIAL 
COMPLEX: HOW THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IS CONSCRIPTING BUSINESSES AND INDIVIDUALS IN 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 12, 26 (2004), available at http://www.aclu. 
org/FilesPDFs/surveillance_report.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/M9EG-4UN6; U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-548, DATA MINING: FEDERAL EFFORTS COVER A WIDE RANGE OF 
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C. How Commercial Uses of Big Data Harm Individuals 
The Big Data movement’s potential to injure consumers has not gone 
unnoticed. Reports commissioned by the federal government have 
cataloged potential drawbacks resulting from the public and private 
sectors’ increasing use of Big Data methodologies.53 Consumer and 
privacy advocates have also identified a general set of harms that 
commercial entities’ employment of predictive analytics could cause.54 
Three significant problems that these groups have pointed out are the risks 
associated with insufficient data security, improper use of individuals’ 
data, and violations of anti-discrimination laws. 
One of the most commonly raised concerns regarding the Big Data 
boom is the increased risk that consumers’ personal information will be 
inappropriately accessed or disclosed to third parties. Harmful data leaks 
generally occur in two contexts. The first are situations where the data-
possessing entity intentionally shares personal information in a manner 
that insufficiently protects individuals’ privacy.55 The second are situations 
where the data-possessing entity fails to implement sufficient safeguards 
and a third party is able to obtain access to the information they have 
stockpiled.
56
 
An incident involving Target Corporation provides a high profile 
example of the first type of intentional disclosure. As part of its 
advertising efforts, Target collects data on each of its customer’s shopping 
histories.
57
 It employs data mining techniques to analyze this information 
and uses the results of its analyses to customize the products included in 
the individualized marketing materials it sends to its customers.
58
 Based 
 
 
USES (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04548.pdf; Fred H. Cate, Government Data 
Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 440–44 (2008). 
 53. See, e.g., BIG DATA REPORT I, supra note 9, at 48–54; BIG DATA REPORT II, supra note 36, at 
11–18. 
 54. See, e.g., STANLEY, supra note 52, at 4–33 (discussing how expansive surveillance by 
commercial entities harms individuals’ rights); Martha C. White, Big Data Knows What You’re Doing 
Right Now, TIME (July 31, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/07/31/big-data-knows-what-youre-
doing-right-now/, archived at https://perma.cc/RWD2-RBDX (same). 
 55.  See sources cited infra notes 58–62. 
 56.  See sources cited infra notes 63–64. 
 57. Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 19, 2012, at MM30, 32, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html (“For decades, 
Target has collected vast amounts of data on every person who regularly walks into one of its stores.”). 
For further discussion of how retailers like Target are collecting data on their customers, see Stephanie 
Clifford & Quentin Hardy, Attention, Shoppers: Store Is Tracking Your Cell, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 
2013, at A1. 
 58. Duhigg, supra note 57, at 35; Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was 
Pregnant Before Her Father Did, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012, 11:02 AM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
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on the purchasing history of one of its teenage customers, Target sent print 
advertisements to a girl’s home that featured a number of pregnancy 
related items.
59
 Her parents did not know of her pregnancy until they 
viewed the materials, meaning that Target effectively disclosed her health 
information to third parties without her consent.
60
 Further, while the 
customer already knew of her pregnancy, Target’s analytics allowed it to 
infer this without her ever affirmatively disclosing her status to the 
company.
61
 It easily could have been the case that the company’s 
accidental disclosure revealed information about the customer that she did 
not know about herself.
62
  
Several examples of unintentional disclosures have made headlines 
recently. A number of the nation’s largest companies have come under fire 
for failing to protect their customers’ personal information from 
unauthorized third party access.
63
 Security breaches at financial 
institutions like JPMorgan Chase Bank, as well as commercial retailers 
like Target, resulted in their customers’ personal data being captured by 
third parties that may have sought to use this information in malicious 
ways.
64
 While utilizing Big Data methodologies does not innately decrease 
a company’s data security, the stockpiling of personal data makes them 
more attractive targets to hackers. 
A second problem with commercial applications of predictive analytics 
is the extent to which commercial entities will use personal information in 
 
 
sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/#6 
514b23134c6. 
 59. See Duhigg, supra note 57, at 36; Hill, supra note 58. 
 60. See Duhigg, supra note 57, at 36; Hill, supra note 58. 
 61.  See Duhigg, supra note 57, at 36; Hill, supra note 58. 
 62. Such disclosures have come to be known as “predictive privacy harms.” See Crawford & 
Schultz, supra note 3, at 96–99; Zhu, supra note 3, at 2387–92. 
 63. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Harris, After Data Breach, Target Plans to Issue More Secure Chip-
and-PIN Cards, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2014, at B3; Susan Ladika, Study: Data Breaches Pose a 
Greater Risk, FOX BUS. (July 28, 2014), http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2014/07/23/ 
study-data-breaches-pose-greater-risk/; Christie Smythe, Data Breaches Found by N.Y. to Have 
Tripled Since 2006, BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 15, 2014, 11:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
2014-07-15/data-breaches-found-by-n-y-to-have-tripled-since-2006.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
VU59-66BV. 
 64. See BIG DATA REPORT II, supra note 36, at 34–35 (discussing the vulnerability of 
companies’ consumer data); Matthew J. Schwartz, Six Worst Data Breaches of 2011, INFO. WEEK 
(Dec. 27, 2011, 4:17 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/attacks/232301079, 
archived at http://perma.cc/26T3-PL6Z; Michael P. Voelker, After ‘Year of the Data Breach,’ Carriers 
Increase Capacity, Competition for Cyber Risks, PROP. CASUALTY 360 (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www. 
propertycasualty360.com/2012/02/02/after-year-of-the-data-breach-carriers-increase-ca, archived at 
http://perma.cc/WM46-RC82. 
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ways that violate contractual or statutory limitations on its use.
65
 When a 
company’s personal information database is composed of information that 
has been gathered from more than one source, it becomes unlikely that 
there will be a uniform set of rules governing the proper use of all of the 
data. Even in situations where the information appears to be gathered in a 
uniform manner, the rules regulating the collection and use of data can 
vary significantly across jurisdictions and over time.
66
 Further, when 
companies purchase data from third party aggregators, it is possible that 
there will be imperfect communication regarding restrictions on how the 
data may be used.
67
 Every time data is exchanged from one entity to 
another, is reformatted for analysis, or is combined with other data, there 
is a chance that it will be disassociated from information about its origins 
and permissible uses. Finally, the dynamic nature of predictive analytics 
inquiries makes respecting consent-based restrictions on use more 
complicated, as data that were compiled with one set of inquiries in mind 
are often used for very different purposes later on.
68
 For instance, even 
data that has been stripped of all personally identifying information at the 
time of collection can lose its anonymity when combined with other data 
sets or when subjected to certain tests.
69
 Indeed, a number of leading 
scholars have expressed skepticism about whether data that is digitally 
collected can ever be permanently anonymized.
70
 
 
 
 65. For further discussion of disclosure and use issues, see Michael Mattioli, Disclosing Big 
Data, 99 MINN. L. REV. 535, 544–48 (2014). 
 66. See BIG DATA REPORT I, supra note 9, at 17–18, 21 (discussing differences between US and 
European regulation of data collection and use).  
 67. CTR. FOR INFO. POL’Y LEADERSHIP, supra note 47, at 15–16 (discussing why problems 
concerning the permissibility of use arise); MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 1, at 153–54 
(describing the conlict between Big Data analyses and consent-based restrictions on the use of data). 
 68. See CTR. FOR INFO. POL’Y LEADERSHIP, supra note 47, at 12 (“Moreover, given that analytics 
entails a knowledge discovery phase that allows for exploration of data to determine what insights it 
may yield . . . providing the disclosure necessary for fully informed consent may not be feasible.”). 
Additionally, the legality of third-party disclosure of personal information that an entity generates by 
analyzing the personal information that an individual permitted the entity to collect raises novel legal 
issues. For further discussion of this issue, see Crawford & Schultz, supra note 3, at 96–99. 
 69. See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1716–31 (2010) (describing how combining anonymous data 
among databases can “de-anonymize” the data); see also Justin Brickell & Vitaly Shmatikov, The Cost 
of Privacy: Destruction of Data-Mining Utility in Anonymized Data Publishing, 2008 ACM 
KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA MINING CONF. 70, 70 (“[E]ven modest privacy gains require almost 
complete destruction of the data-mining utility.”). 
 70. See Larry Hardesty, How Hard Is It to ‘De-Anonymize’ Cellphone Data?, MIT NEWS (Mar. 
27, 2013), http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2013/de-anonymize-cellphone-data-0327.html, archived at 
https://perma.cc/8B2J-3SLL; Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-Anonymization of 
Large Sparse Datasets, 2008 IEEE SYMP. ON SEC. & PRIVACY 111. 
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Using predictive analytics for commercial applications will also 
increase the likelihood that companies will engage in prohibited forms of 
discrimination. Federal and state statutes and regulations prohibit 
commercial actors from discriminating between individuals on a variety of 
characteristics—for example, gender, age, credit score, race, and sexual 
orientation—in certain contexts.71 Not only do these laws proscribe 
intentionally treating individuals differently due to their membership in a 
protected class (“disparate treatment”), but some sanction actions that—
regardless of intent—disproportionately disadvantage members of a 
protected class (“disparate impact”).72 Use of Big Data analytics can lead 
to an increase in disparate impact violations of these laws by encouraging 
commercial actors to discriminate among current and potential customers 
on the bases of characteristics that, while not protected classes themselves, 
are highly correlated with ones that are.
73
 
II. THE DATA REVOLUTION WILL CHANGE INSURANCE MARKETS, FOR 
BETTER AND FOR WORSE 
Having reviewed the basics of predictive analytics and the Big Data 
movement’s impact on commercial activity in general, the stage is set for a 
focused discussion of how these developments will affect insurance 
markets. It is clear that the data revolution has already affected insurance 
companies’ operations and will continue to do so in the future. Identifying 
these changes and anticipating how they will impact public interests are 
critically important initial steps towards ensuring that insurance markets 
continue to function properly.  
The most significant impact that technological advances in data 
collection and analytics will have on the insurance industry will be the 
removal of economic constraints that have traditionally limited insurers. 
Once the costs associated with gathering and analyzing data become 
 
 
 71. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2014) (prohibiting 
discrimination against individuals on the basis of disability); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2014) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and 
national origin); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2014); TEX. BUS. & COM. 
CODE § 544.001 (2015) (prohibiting insurers from discriminating on the basis of ten characteristics). 
 72. See generally George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially 
Contested Concept of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313, 2313–23 (2006) (providing an overview of 
legal liability standards in anti-discrimination law); Michael Selmi, Was Disparate Impact Theory a 
Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 702–04 (2006) (same). 
 73. See Crawford & Schultz, supra note 3, at 99–102 (describing how Big Data analytics could 
encourage private entities to take actions that would disproportionately harm protected classes); see 
also discussion infra Part II.C.2. 
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minimal, insurers will have strong economic incentives to start 
differentiating between consumers in new ways. There are ways in which 
this would improve the market. By analyzing greater amounts of data, 
insurers will be able to more accurately tailor the pricing of their policies, 
which would increase actuarial fairness, address several longstanding 
problems related to consumer incentives, and aid insurers’ efforts to 
prevent losses from occurring. However, there are also ways in which it 
will harm the market. Increasing the extent to which insurers discriminate 
between consumers will undermine anti-discrimination, redistributionist, 
and personal liberty interests.
74
 
This Part proceeds as follows. It begins with an overview of the ways 
that the data revolution has already changed the insurance industry. Next, 
it discusses how further technological developments will increase insurers’ 
capabilities in two core operations—underwriting and claims 
management. While these improvements will generate benefits for both 
insurers and consumers, they will also threaten public interests. The third 
part describes the market values that will be jeopardized by advances in 
data technology. It concludes with thoughts about how regulators should 
weigh these beneficial and detrimental effects against one another. 
For the sake of simplicity, the following analysis proceeds under two 
assumptions. First, it assumes that the costs associated with collecting, 
analyzing, and storing data will continue to decrease over time, meaning 
that the costs of these tasks will not prevent private entities from working 
with massive amounts of personal data.
75
 Second, it supposes that 
governmental regulatory bodies will not constrain insurers’ use of 
predictive analytics—that is, they will not introduce new regulations nor 
will they step up their use of the powers they possess under existing 
regulatory schemes. Part III discusses how things look when the second 
assumption is relaxed, and provides an overview of the current state of 
regulation, the measures that governmental bodies might take in the future, 
and the effect that these potential actions would have on the harms caused 
by private regulators. 
 
 
 74. See infra Part II.C.  
 75. See John O. McGinnis, Accelerating AI, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1253, 1257–58 (2010) 
(“Moore’s law, named after Gordon Moore, one of Intel’s founders, is the observation that the number 
of transistors fitting onto a computer chip doubles every eighteen months to two years.”); Daniel 
Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—Or—How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start 
Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909, 914 (2013) 
(footnote omitted) (“Although there is reason to believe [Moore’s law] will ultimately abate, it appears 
this process of doubling will continue for the foreseeable future.”). 
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A. Big Data’s Impact on Contemporary Insurance Practices 
At first blush, it may seem as though the Big Data movement will 
affect different industries in a relatively uniform fashion. The increased 
use of analytics in advertising and marketing, for instance, will end up 
having similar impacts on the business practices of companies in different 
economic sectors. This intuition, however, buckles when one realizes that 
certain industries have a greater capacity to incorporate analytics into their 
operations. The insurance industry is an example of an economic sector 
that is uniquely well positioned to employ Big Data methodologies.
76
 This 
Subpart outlines how insurers have already begun to incorporate analytics 
into their operations, thereby setting the stage for the following Subparts’ 
discussions of the benefits and harms that will result from these changes.  
Leading companies in the data analytics services sector have 
recognized insurance as one of the primary industries that will benefit 
from the increased availability of data and breakthroughs in predictive 
analytics.
77
 Indeed, analytics companies have identified ways in which the 
information generated through cutting-edge data science techniques could 
be incorporated into practically every aspect of insurance companies’ 
operations.
78
 While there has been substantial variation in the degree to 
which insurers have adopted such data-driven practices, it is becoming 
increasingly clear that analytics will assume a central role in the field. 
Three segments of insurers’ operations have been identified as the main 
areas that will be affected by the Big Data movement: marketing, claims 
management, and underwriting/pricing.
79
 While insurers’ actions in each 
of these areas have always been data-driven, the Big Data revolution has 
enabled companies to analyze sets of data that are much larger in size and 
derived from a greater number of sources than were previously used.
80
 
 
 
 76. See sources cited supra note 4. 
 77. See Brian Womack & Trish Regan, Google’s Schmidt Says Data Can Change Insurance, 
Health Care, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 21, 2013, 1:19 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-
11-21/google-s-schmidt-says-big-data-can-change-insurance-health-care (quoting Google Inc.’s 
Executive Chairman as stating that “‘Insurance is the most obvious [industry] about to explode’ with 
uses for big data”). 
 78. See, e.g., CORBETT ET AL., supra note 5, at 3–7 (describing how advanced analytics could be 
incorporated into insurers’ marketing, underwriting, claims management, and other practices); 
STACKIQ, CAPITALIZING ON BIG DATA ANALYTICS FOR THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 3–4 (2012) 
(same). 
 79. See NYCE, supra note 22, at 2–5 (discussing how Big Data could improve insurers’ 
capabilities in these three areas); CORBETT ET AL., supra note 5, at 3–4, 6 (same). 
 80. See MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 1, at 1–3; Kim Gittleson, How Big Data Is Changing the 
Cost of Insurance, BBC NEWS (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-24941415, 
archived at https://perma.cc/B42R-BW97. 
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Furthermore, companies have begun to view predictive analytics as a 
mechanism that will enable them to automate and systematize tasks in 
each of these areas, eliminating the need to have individual employees 
perform them on a case-by-case, discretionary basis.
81
 
Like many other industries, insurance companies have begun to explore 
ways in which predictive analytics can enhance their advertising and 
marketing practices. By analyzing data that captures consumers’ 
demographic information, purchasing habits, risk preferences, and other 
characteristics, insurers can take steps to make sure that they are utilizing 
their marketing resources in an optimal manner.
82
 The introduction of Big 
Data methodologies provides companies with the opportunity to ensure 
that they have identified the characteristics that best predict consumers’ 
reactions to their products.
83
 Such information is highly valuable to 
insurers, as it both enables them to gauge whether they are reaching out to 
the right set of consumers and facilitates efforts to customize their 
marketing approaches to different groups in a cost-efficient manner.
84
 
Insurers have also started to integrate analyses of Big Data into their 
claims management systems.
85
 Casualty insurers have been particularly 
interested in exploring ways that analytics can be used to determine 
whether a policyholder’s claim should be investigated for fraud.86 The 
increased availability of data and advances in computational power have 
enabled companies to scrutinize past claims more expansively than ever 
before. This has helped them to identify indicia of fraud that were not 
recorded in their internal documents and create automated processes that 
will flag incoming claims that possess specified qualities.
87
 Additionally, 
insurers have expressed interest in finding ways that they could use 
information about their consumers to automate all or part of their claims 
handling systems.
88
  
Finally, insurers have incorporated predictive analytics into their 
businesses’ pricing and underwriting operations. Companies have always 
analyzed information about applicants when making decisions about 
 
 
 81. See sources cited supra note 72. 
 82. See NYCE, supra note 22, at 4–5 (describing how insurers could use Big Data to improve 
their marketing practices). 
 83. See id. at 4–5. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. at 5–6 (describing how insurers could use Big Data to improve their ability to detect 
fraudulent claims and prioritize claims in an optimal manner). 
 86. See id. at 5–6; CORBETT ET AL., supra note 5, at 4 (providing an example of an insurer that 
used advanced analytics to partially automate its fraud detection system). 
 87. See NYCE, supra note 22, at 5–6. 
 88. Id. at 5–6; CORBETT ET AL., supra note 5, at 4. 
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whether they are willing to offer them coverage for particular risks and, if 
they are willing, their premium rates.
89
 Insurers have, however, 
traditionally been limited in the amount of data that they could obtain 
about applicants and in their ability to make use of information that was 
not directly related to the risks being insured against. The data revolution 
resolves both problems. It offers insurers technologies that can enhance 
the scope and accuracy of their predictive models and provides them with 
cheap access to an abundance of information about individuals, the two 
prerequisites for identifying qualities that correlate with risk of loss in a 
cost-effective manner.
90
 
The rate at which different actors in the insurance industry have 
incorporated Big Data methodologies into their operations has varied 
wildly.
91
 Further, advances in analytics have had more immediate impacts 
in certain operational areas than others. In general, larger insurers have 
acted more quickly than their smaller counterparts.
92
  
While the integration of Big Data analytics into insurers’ operations 
may appear to constitute a mere expansion of their current practices, it will 
lead to significant innovations. One of the best examples of this has been 
the efforts of auto insurance companies to integrate telematics data into 
their pricing practices.
93
 These insurers have attempted to persuade their 
policyholders to agree to install devices in their cars that will 
automatically transmit information concerning the policyholder’s driving 
practices to the insurer.
94
 The insurer then uses this data to create a more 
accurate risk profile for the policyholder and, once this occurs, adjusts the 
customer’s premium rates to reflect the likelihood that they will 
experience a covered loss.
95
 While exisiting telematics programs have 
 
 
 89. See JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIES DON’T PAY 
CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT 14–15 (2010) (describing insurance companies’ 
underwriting and rate setting operations); JEFFREY W. STEMPEL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 
LAW 96 (4th ed. 2012) (same). 
 90. CORBETT ET AL., supra note 5, at 6 (describing how new technologies enabled an auto insurer 
to collect better data on its customers and identify factors that correlate with risk); NYCE, supra note 
22, at 5 (describing how predictive analytics can improve insurers’ ability to detect risk factors). 
 91. See CORBETT ET AL., supra note 5, at 1–3; EARNIX & INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 5, 
at 6; Brinkmann & Watkins, supra note 5, at 30. 
 92. EARNIX & INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 5, at 2–3, 7 (presenting data about the rate at 
which insurers have adopted Big Data analytics). 
 93. See SAS INST. INC., supra note 6 (providing an overview of the use of telematics data in the 
auto insurance context); Stross, supra note 6 (same); Boulton, supra note 6 (same). 
 94. See, e.g., What Is a Telematics Device?, ALLSTATE (Jan. 2014), http://www.allstate.com/ 
tools-and-resources/car-insurance/telematics-device.aspx, archived at https://perma.cc/786Q-2HDW. 
 95. Id.  
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used data to reduce the premiums charged to low-risk policyholders,
96
 
such information could just as easily be used to increase the premiums for 
high-risk drivers or as grounds for refusing to renew a customer’s policy.97 
The collection and use of telematics data is a very significant development 
in the insurance industry as it provides one of the first examples of 
insurers using technological advances in data collection to create 
additional data about individuals that did not exist previously. This 
innovation can be viewed as part of an even larger trend—the growing 
willingness of insurers to use new types of information to justify offering 
consumers different levels of access to insurance products. 
A second example of Big Data’s influence occurs when casualty 
insurers analyze information about their policyholders’ activities on social 
media sites (e.g., Facebook, Twitter) to inform their determinations about 
the likelihood that claims are fraudulent.
98
 While insurers have a long 
history of scrutinizing policyholders’ claims for fraud, they have typically 
focused on searching for information that is strongly probative of deceit. 
For example, insurers have traditionally looked for sudden increases in a 
policyholder’s need for cash, inconsistencies in an injured party’s medical 
evaluations, or the presence of accelerants at the site of a fire.
99
 Allowing 
coverage decisions to be influenced by a policyholder’s presence or 
activities on social media sites—data that would not typically be 
considered to have a strong relationship with fraud—constitutes a 
substantial departure from traditional practices.  
By all accounts, it appears as though the insurance industry’s 
utilization of predictive analytics will expand significantly in the coming 
years. Industry documents indicate that a majority of insurance companies 
use predictive analytics in at least one of their lines of business.
100
 Indeed, 
over the past five years there has been a drastic increase in the number of 
insurance companies subscribing to the belief that the use of analytics 
 
 
 96. How’s My Driving?, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 23, 2013, at 43, 43.  
 97. Adam Tanner, Data Monitoring Saves Some People Money on Car Insurance, but Some Will 
Pay More, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2013, 4:21 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamtanner/2013/08/ 
14/data-monitoring-saves-some-people-money-on-car-insurance-but-some-will-pay-more/, archived at 
https://perma.cc/2BPC-DL2U. 
 98. See SAS INST. INC., COMBATING INSURANCE CLAIMS FRAUD 7–8 (2012), available at 
http://support.sas.com/resources/papers/proceedings12/105573_0212.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/ 
7UTD-8NJ8 (describing how an insurer’s analysis of social media can be automated); Babu & 
Chattopadhyay, supra note 8 (describing how social media information could play a part in insurers’ 
fraud detection efforts); Ha, supra note 8 (“Already, scouring Facebook and other social network 
pages of the insureds is a common practice on the claims side of the business.”). 
 99. See generally ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, INSURANCE FRAUD HANDBOOK 42–
102 (2009) (describing the traditional method for investigating the veracity of an insurance claim).  
 100. See EARNIX & INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 5, at 6.  
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creates a competitive advantage for their organization.
101
 It is certain these 
changes will impact consumers and, as more insurers increase their use of 
Big Data analytics, the magnitude of the potential ramifications for 
consumers will continue to grow larger. 
B. Big Data’s Big Benefits: Actuarial Fairness & Loss Prevention 
Some scholars and industry entities have portrayed the “datafication”102 
of the world as potentially creating a panacea for insurance markets.
103
 
Such rosy predictions are not entirely lacking in merit—the data 
revolution will drastically increase insurers’ ability to predict losses and 
this, in the presence of market competition, will cause insurers to charge 
policyholders rates that reflect their individualized risks of loss.
104
 An 
understanding of the central role that data plays in the profitability of 
insurers’ operations explains why these changes will lead to actuarial 
fairness in the insurance industry. It also demonstrates both how actuarial 
fairness could help solve some of the problems that have traditionally 
plagued insurance markets and how advances in data technology will 
enhance insurers’ loss prevention efforts.105 
One of the unique aspects of insurance is the extent to which insurers 
can make use of data about their customers. Unlike most consumer goods, 
insurance products are not offered to everyone—the legal system allows 
insurers to selectively offer policies to individuals.
106
 Furthermore, 
insurance policies are products where the price and terms of the deal can 
vary substantially based on the purchaser’s characteristics. Insurers are 
permitted to discriminate among customers in these ways because, unlike 
most goods, the value of insurance coverage is entirely dependent on the 
identity of the purchaser. An auto insurance policy issued to a seventy-
 
 
 101. CORBETT ET AL., supra note 5, at 2 (reporting a 111% increase in the number of insurance 
companies who report gaining competitive advantages from the use of analytics). 
 102. Datafication is a recently coined term that refers to increases in the extent to which data are 
collected about events in the world. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 1, at 78. 
 103. See CORBETT ET AL., supra note 5, 1–3 (reporting that insurers have begun to pursue 
integration of predictive analytics into all of their core business operations); Brinkmann & Watkins, 
supra note 5, at 28–30 (discussing how advances in data science will change the insurance industry); 
cf. Swedloff, supra note 4, at 340–44 (discussing how Big Data could benefit and harm insurance 
markets). 
 104. See sources cited supra notes 4–8. 
 105.  See sources cited supra notes 4–8. 
 106. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 71 VA. L. 
REV. 403, 407–08 (1985) (describing insurers’ ability to discriminate when setting rates and issuing 
policies); Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces 
Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 205–11 (2012) (same). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
882 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:859 
 
 
 
 
year-old widower who drives once a month is less likely to generate 
claims than the same policy issued to a teenage male who uses his car to 
drive to school, work, and social events.
107
 Because there are vastly 
different odds that the insurer will have to cover a loss under each of these 
policies, it makes economic sense to allow the insurer to charge the 
widower and the teenage male different rates. Similarly, it might not make 
sense for an insurer to sell coverage to an individual with a record of 
traffic accidents and several arrests for driving under the influence of 
alcohol, given the near certainty that such a person will experience 
significant losses again.
108
 Parallel hypotheticals could justify 
underwriting and rate discrimination in life, homeowner’s, and other forms 
of coverage.
109
 
While it is expensive for insurers to discriminate among individuals in 
this manner, the ubiquity of the practice establishes that, at some level, it 
can be cost-effective. One of the steps that insurers have taken to reduce 
the costs associated with customer discrimination is to create mathematical 
formulas that automate assessment of an applicant’s risk profile.110 
Analyzing individuals in this way is not a new practice—insurers have 
attempted to improve and standardize their rate and insurability 
determinations for hundreds of years
111—but the entry of Big Data 
methodologies and capabilities has opened new doors for insurers.
112
 
Additionally, acts that would have once required prohibitively large 
amounts of labor—for example, combing individuals’ social media pages 
for information that could affect the insurer’s risk profile of a policyholder 
or provide indirect evidence of fraudulent behavior—can be automated to 
consume inexpensive computer processing power and storage, with 
 
 
 107. See Jessica Bosari, What Really Goes into Determining Your Insurance Rates?, FORBES (Jan. 
8, 2013, 11:53 AM), http://onforb.es/TIVJ1M. 
 108. Id. 
 109. A recent governmental report found that there was little evidence of price discrimination in 
consumer markets. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE WHITE HOUSE, BIG DATA AND 
DIFFERENTIAL PRICING 2 (2015). The study also noted that price discrimination’s role in insurance 
markets raises equitable concerns. Id. at 17.  
 110. See, e.g., CAUTION!: The Secret Score Behind Your Auto Insurance, CONSUMER REPORTS, 
Aug. 2006, at 43, available at http://consumersunion.org/pdf/CR-Aug2006.pdf. 
 111. See generally BERNSTEIN, supra note 24 (describing the gradual evolution of humanity’s 
ability to make predictions and price risk). 
 112. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 1, at 56–57 (describing insurers’ attempts 
to utilize Big Data analytics in their operations). One of the large reports on Big Data, commissioned 
by the White House in 2014, noted that the use of analytics opens the door to price discrimination in 
general markets, but did not comment specifically on insurance markets. See BIG DATA REPORT I, 
supra note 9, at 46–47. 
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minimal human oversight.
113
 Finally, regressions and other analytic tests 
that would have taxed the world’s best processors a decade or two ago 
could potentially be performed by insurers’ in-house computers.114 
Not only has the data revolution begun to enable insurers to analyze 
criteria that they previously lacked the resources to review, but it also has 
enabled insurers to drastically expand the types of information that factor 
into their rate setting and underwriting practices. Technological advances 
have resulted in a decrease in costs associated with the collection and 
storage of data.
115
 This has led to the creation of incredibly large troves of 
personal information—much of it data that was not recorded in prior eras. 
Insurers are able to access this information at a cost that is a fraction of 
what it would have been previously.
116
  
Assuming costs continue to fall over time, it will become efficient for 
companies to collect and mine increasingly larger data sets, incorporating 
more and more factors into their underwriting and rate setting algorithms. 
This will constitute a highly significant change in the industry—the costs 
of data collection and analysis have traditionally forced insurers to analyze 
only the qualities that bear on risk of loss in obvious ways.
117
 Eventually, 
the data revolution will remove these constraints, causing insurers to 
evolve from entities that predict and price risk based on a very limited set 
of information and analytics into entities that predict and price risk with 
virtually unlimited data and analytics. 
 
 
 113. See MCKINSEY & CO., UNLEASHING THE VALUE OF ADVANCED ANALYTICS IN INSURANCE 6 
(2013), available at http://solutions.mckinsey.com/Index/media/62687/Unleashing_the_value_of_ 
advanced_analytics_in_insurance.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/D3KV-S2FQ (discussing operational 
areas where predictive analytics has allowed automation to replace human labor). 
 114. See, e.g., id. at 2–4 (“Over the past 15 years . . . revolutionary advances in computing 
technology and the explosion of new digital data sources have expanded and reinvented the core 
disciplines of insurers.”); Matthew Sipe, Storage Wars: Greater Protection for Messages in Memory, 
124 YALE L.J. F. 29, 30–31 (2014) (stating that “[i]mprovements to search algorithms and data 
analytics” have occurred at a rapid pace); see also sources cited supra note 75. 
 115. See, e.g., Siraj Datoo, Rapid Development in Big Data Analytics Has Led to Increased 
Investment, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2013, 10:55 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/news/2013/ 
nov/22/rapid-development-in-big-data-analytics-has-led-to-increased-investment (describing how data 
collection, storage, and analysis costs have plummeted in recent years). 
 116. See MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 1, at 2–4 (“The ability to store, aggregate, and combine data 
and then use the results to perform deep analyses has become ever more accessible . . . .”); NYCE, 
supra note 22, at 2 (“[T]here are numerous third party sources of data that insurers can use to develop 
predictive models.”). 
 117. See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 113, at 2–4; Industry Roundtable: The Role of Analytics 
and Big Data in Insurance, VERISK ANALYTICS, http://www.verisk.com/Verisk-Review/Articles/ 
Industry-Roundtable-The-Role-of-Analytics-and-Big-Data-in-Insurance.html (last visited June 4, 
2016), archived at https://perma.cc/ZJ45-LJXS (describing how insurers have used analytics to expand 
the types of data they analyze when underwriting and setting rates). 
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The impact that these developments will have on insurer behavior can 
be demonstrated through an illustration. First, consider an insurance 
company that is deciding whether to issue a homeowner’s policy to a 
consumer. Traditionally, the company would review information about the 
property (e.g., the age of the house, its related claims history), the 
homeowner (e.g., their credit history), and the neighboring area (e.g., 
crime data, proximity to a fire station). As the costs associated with data 
gathering and analysis decrease, however, the insurer will increase the 
number of factors it uses in its risk assessment tools.
118
 Its analysis of the 
neighboring area, for example, might look for the presence of specific 
types of businesses or demographic trends. How the company assesses 
individuals’ odds of experiencing a loss could expand beyond analysis of 
public records and disclosed information (e.g., credit reports, criminal 
records, and basic personal information) to include individuals’ shopping 
histories, website browsing records, and GPS tracking. These examples 
are not the products of mere speculation—insurers have indicated strong 
interest in expanding their practices to include analyses of these types of 
data and, in many cases, have already begun doing so.
119
 
Insurers having access to massive data sets and analytic tools would 
generate substantial market benefits. When the cost of data acquisition and 
analysis becomes negligible, insurers will be able to put themselves in the 
best position possible to predict the likelihood that individuals will 
experience losses. This boost in predictive power, paired with continued 
automation of the underwriting process, will increase insurers’ ability to 
tailor policy rates on a policyholder-by-policyholder basis.
120
 Once this 
occurs, insurance markets will begin to exhibit an unprecedented level of 
actuarial fairness. 
 
 
 118. See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 113, at 1–3 (discussing how Big Data has already had this 
effect in certain parts of the insurance industry). Some may question whether such predictions about 
insurer behavior are realistic, arguing that the majority of the relationships between risk and the 
additional data that insurers will be able to analyze are likely to be tenuous. See generally NATE 
SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE (2012). Even if this were the case, however, it seems likely that 
data mining will uncover at least some qualities that improve upon the predictions generated by purely 
traditional approaches. Auto insurers’ use of data generated by telematics provides one example of 
this. See sources cited supra notes 93–97. 
 119. See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 113, at 3 (reporting information about insurers’ exisiting 
and planned uses of predictive analytics); EARNIX & INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 5, at 16 
(same); Industry Roundtable: The Role of Analytics and Big Data in Insurance, supra note 117. 
 120. See ERNST & YOUNG, 2014 GLOBAL INSURANCE OUTLOOK 16 (2014) (“This more granular 
view of insured risk attributes and loss costs can be correlated with premium and loss data to inform 
pricing platforms and develop better risk-scoring tools.”); THE ECONOMIST, THE WAY FORWARD: 
INSURANCE IN AN AGE OF CUSTOMER INTIMACY AND INTERNET OF THINGS 13–14 (2014) (discussing 
how technology will enable insurers to personalize their products). 
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There are a number of reasons that insurers accurately matching rates 
to risk on a policyholder-by-policyholder basis would be beneficial. First, 
there is a basic equitable appeal to this type of pricing. Many people have 
a strong intuition that a system that charges everyone rates that reflect each 
individual’s level of risk is more fair than a system that forces some 
individuals to subsidize others.
121
 
Highly tailored pricing practices would also help resolve the adverse 
selection problems that some scholars have raised about insurance 
markets.
122
 Traditionally, there have been concerns about insurance 
markets being undersubscribed (or failing altogether). This is due to 
insufficient price differentiation driving low-risk individuals to seek 
alternative means of dealing with risk and incentivizing high-risk 
individuals to purchase coverage.
123
 If insurers gain the capacity to 
generate accurate individualized rates, these concerns disappear—low-risk 
individuals will have no incentive to leave the insurance pool if their rates 
are not inflated because they are pooled with high-risk individuals.
124
 
Finally, increased granularity in rate setting and substantial increases in 
insurers’ predictive abilities could provide the industry with effective 
means for combating moral hazard.
125
 In every line of insurance, there is a 
concern that the act of procuring coverage will cause policyholders to stop 
taking the precautions or other risk-reducing actions that they would have 
taken without insurance.
126
 This is harmful because the increased risk 
represented by such changes in behavior is normally not included in their 
premium rates. Further, this type of policyholder behavior is undesirable 
because it increases the amount of accident-related losses.
127
 If one 
presumes that data can predict whether an individual is likely to reduce 
 
 
 121. See, e.g., Swedloff, supra note 4, at 346 (“[P]ricing based on risk may be more fair to low 
risk insureds.”); Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk 
Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 383 (2003) (“The leading moral justifications for risk 
classification are the following: 1) without risk classification, low risks are unfairly forced to subsidize 
high risks . . . .”). 
 122. NYCE, supra note 22, at 3 (“As more insurers use predictive analytics, those not doing so will 
be increasingly exposed to adverse selection . . . .”); Swedloff, supra note 4, at 346–47. 
 123. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 6–7 (5th ed. 2010) 
(summarizing adverse selection problems in insurance pools); TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND 
POLICY 6–7 (2d ed. 2008) (same). 
 124. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 67 (1986); ABRAHAM, supra note 123, at 6–7; Baker, supra note 121, at 377; Swedloff, supra 
note 4, at 346–47. 
 125. Swedloff, supra note 4, at 346–47. 
 126. See ABRAHAM, supra note 123, at 7 (summarizing moral hazard problems in insurance 
pools); BAKER, supra note 123, at 4–5 (same). 
 127. See sources cited supra note 120. 
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their level of care after getting insurance coverage, then a data-saturated 
insurer could simply price moral hazard risk into their rates.
128
 An insurer 
could also make it known that certain observable risk-enhancing changes 
in behavior will result in higher rates (or invalidation of coverage), 
removing the economic incentives for policyholders to change their 
behaviors.
129
 
Increased use of analytics in the insurance industry could also benefit 
society by enhancing the ability of insurers to induce private actors to take 
cost-efficient actions that reduce risk. As discussed in greater depth in the 
following part, insurance companies have a long tradition of using the 
leverage they have over their customers to force them to decrease their risk 
of loss by instituting safety measures.
130
 To the extent that the measures 
adopted by insurers are cost-effective and do not harm other interests, this 
practice is utility maximizing and benefits society. 
Advances in data science will greatly enhance insurers’ loss reduction 
capabilities. Analyzing vast data sets will enable insurers to identify a 
larger set of factors that affect the likelihood a loss will occur.
131
 While 
many of these factors are outside of the policyholder’s control (e.g., the 
geographic location of their home), some will be characteristics that are 
susceptible to modification (e.g., the presence of smoke detectors). The 
economic gains associated with having their customers take risk-reducing 
actions will push insurers to increase the number of such conditions they 
impose on policyholders.
132
 Technological developments will also 
decrease monitoring costs, enabling insurers to police policyholders’ 
compliance with the risk-reducing obligations contained in their 
policies.
133
   
 
 
 128. See ABRAHAM, supra note 123, at 7. 
 129. See Swedloff, supra note 4, at 346–47 (making a similar observation). 
 130. See infra Part II.C. 
 131. See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 120, at 14 (stating that the Big Data explosion will provide 
insurers with “more and better information on a far wider variety of risks than has ever before been 
captured”). 
 132. See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 113, at 4 (“Real-time monitoring and visualization is 
fundamentally changing the relationship of insurers and the insured. . . . [I]nsurance companies can 
leverage the data to influence behaviors.”); Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 106, at 205–12 
(describing how insurers regulate policyholders’ behaviors); see also THE ECONOMIST, supra note 120, 
at 14 (describing insurers’ interest in expanding consumer monitoring incentives and requirements). 
 133. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 120, at 14 (describing insurers’ interest in expanding consumer 
monitoring incentives and requirements). 
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C. Advanced Insurance Analytics’ Threat to Traditional Market Goals  
The significant benefits that would be gained by advances in insurers’ 
predictive abilities and actuarial fairness, however, would not be without 
costs. As described earlier, any commercial entity’s collection and use of 
data increases certain risks.
134
 Drastic expansions in insurers’ use of data 
would not only raise these generic problems, but would pose unique 
threats to public interests. 
While increased actuarial fairness would improve several metrics used 
to evaluate insurance markets (e.g., subscription rates, rate fairness, insurer 
stability), these are not the only qualities that healthy markets are expected 
to possess. A market that performs exceptionally well on the factors 
improved by actuarial fairness could still be deemed toxic if, for instance, 
it systematically disadvantaged racial minorities. It is possible to identify 
several values society expects insurance markets to respect and that would 
be imperiled by the industry’s expanded use of data analytics. 
This Subpart provides a brief description of each of these values and 
how they are affected by insurers with advanced data capabilities. In the 
course of doing so, it shows why an insurance market that is fully 
committed to actuarial fairness and loss reduction would not only fail to 
advance these values, but would actively work against them. This sets the 
stage for Part III’s discussion of how regulation could help ensure that 
markets possess an optimal balance of these societal interests. 
1. Personal Liberty and Autonomy Norms 
One set of values that the public expects markets to recognize is the 
preservation of personal liberties and autonomy. As a general premise, 
modern society has attempted to prevent individuals’ freedom from being 
limited in ways that it deems to be unfair, exploitative, or coercive. Much 
of contract and consumer law seeks to regulate market conduct in ways 
that prevent these types of abuses.
135
 
Given that all contractual agreements place constraints on autonomy, it 
cannot be the case that limiting autonomy is an inherently negative act. 
Rather, society has identified specific types of restrictions as being too 
 
 
 134. See supra Part I.C. 
 135.  See, e.g., Max Helveston & Michael Jacobs, The Incoherent Role of Bargaining Power in 
Contract Law, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1017, 1050–56 (2014) (describing commercial practices that 
have been prohibited through common law, legislative, and regulatory measures). 
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unfair or too exploitative.
136
 It is only these restraints that markets are 
expected to respect.  
Commercial deals can impermissibly limit individuals’ autonomy in 
two situations. Most commonly, this occurs when a powerful party forces 
a consumer to agree to contractual terms that unfairly limit her freedom, 
either by compelling, banning, or incentivizing certain conduct.
137
 There 
are countless examples of legislatures, agencies, and courts creating rules 
that make specific contractual terms unenforceable.
138
 Less often 
recognized is the concern for consumer autonomy in situations where a 
powerful party engages in pre-contractual behaviors that impermissibly 
affect an individual’s behaviors.139 Due to the fact that price discrimination 
is uncommon in consumer goods markets, the state has rarely needed to 
police consumer markets for this type of behavior.
140
 Perhaps the best 
examples of regulation of pre-contractual behaviors are laws that ban 
insurers from considering certain types of information when determining 
whether to insure individuals. For instance, the Affordable Care Act’s 
community rating rules prevent insurers from refusing to insure diabetics, 
nullifying any behavior-modifying incentives that would be created by 
such a practice.
141
 
Insurers’ means for constraining the autonomy of private actors are 
relatively straightforward. Whenever an insurer adopts a rule that governs 
its price-setting, underwriting, or other customer-related processes, it has 
taken an action that may force a private actor to behave in a certain way.
142
 
For example, an insurer might influence policyholders’ behaviors by 
 
 
 136. See id. 
 137. Id. at 1051–52, 1054–55. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See id. at 1055–56.  
 140. Price discrimination based on consumers’ individual characteristics is uncommon outside of 
the insurance industry. The highest profile example of such conduct involved the discovery that 
Amazon.com was charging its customers different prices based on algorithmic estimates of what an 
individual would be willing to pay for an item. See Robert M. Weiss & Ajay K. Mehrotra, Online 
Dynamic Pricing: Efficiency, Equity and the Future of E-Commerce, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 11, at *1–4 
(2001). Part of the reason why businesses do not engage in differential pricing is the Robinson-Patman 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2014), which prohibits companies from engaging in price discrimination in the 
sale of commodities. But see Douglas M. Kochelek, Data Mining and Antitrust, 22 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 515, 524–26 (2009) (arguing that the Act would not apply to Amazon’s conduct); HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAWS OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 14.1 
(3d ed. 2005) (noting the federal government’s limited enforcement of the Act). 
 141. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701, 2705 (2014). 
 142. See Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers 
Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412, 1418–30 (2013) (describing how insurers regulate 
policyholders’ behavior to reduce risk of loss); Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 106, at 205–12 
(same). 
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deciding that it will no longer offer commercial property coverage for 
warehouses that lack sprinkler systems. Whether a private party’s behavior 
is affected by an insurer’s policy will depend on a variety of factors, such 
as the availability of alternative providers with different policies, the 
degree to which the private party needs coverage, etc. If such rules attain a 
sufficient level of ubiquity across insurers, however, consumers will have 
no choice but to comply with the rules’ requirements or forego 
coverage.
143
 
It is widely accepted that insurance companies’ practices have large 
impacts on consumer behaviors. Insurers compel policyholders to take 
certain actions by fiat (e.g., we will only insure you if you install smoke 
alarms) and economic incentives (e.g., we will give you lower rates if you 
install a telematics device in your car and drive a certain way). 
Individuals’ autonomy is also constrained by the conditions that insurers 
place on coverage. Insurance policies are somewhat unique among 
consumer contracts in the number of continuing obligations that they 
impose on policyholders. In homeowners’ policies, for instance, the 
standard policy contains requirements concerning claim reporting,
144
 
cooperation with the insurer regarding claim investigation and claim-
related litigation,
145
 payment of premiums,
146
 cancellation and non-renewal 
of the policy,
147
 and duties regarding post-loss repairs to the property.
148
 
Further, the limitations placed on covered losses can influence 
policyholders’ behaviors—they can affect individuals’ maintenance and 
occupancy decisions,
149
 discourage construction projects,
150
 and alter 
personal behaviors.
151
 
Insurer-imposed regulation of consumer conduct is not an inherently 
bad thing. The industry has a long history of premising policyholders’ 
coverage on their installation and maintenance of safety equipment or on 
the performance of other risk-reducing actions.
152
 For instance, insurers 
 
 
 143. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 106, at 205–12 (describing how concerted action by 
insurers can force policyholder conduct); Christopher C. French, The Role of the Profit Imperative in 
Risk Management, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1081, 1096–115 (2015) (same). 
 144. See INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., HOMEOWNERS 3—SPECIAL FORM, at 13, 20–21 (1999), 
reprinted in ABRAHAM, supra note 123, at 194–219. 
 145. Id. at 13, 20. 
 146. Id. at 21. 
 147. Id. at 21–22. 
 148. Id. at 13, 20. 
 149. Id. at 8–9, 11. 
 150. Id. at 9, 12. 
 151. Id. at 18–20. 
 152. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 106, at 210–12 (discussing how insurers have tied 
policyholders’ insurability to their taking risk-reduction measures). 
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have required business owners to install sprinkler systems in their 
buildings, retain security personnel, and refrain from performing specified 
types of business activities as conditions of coverage.
153
 While such 
demands directly regulate applicant and policyholder behaviors, they do so 
in a way that most individuals recognize as legitimate.  
But not all of insurers’ conduct-regulating measures have been as 
innocuous or well received by the public. Perhaps the best-known example 
of an objectionable exclusionary rule would be pre-ACA health insurers’ 
refusal to offer coverage to individuals with certain chronic or severe 
diseases at any price.
154
 Another would be certain companies’ refusal to 
issue homeowner’s insurance to households with pets that it deems to be 
high-risk (e.g., pit bulls).
155
 
Even if one believes that insurers have not yet overstepped their 
bounds in constraining consumer autonomy, this could easily change in 
the Big Data era. As will be discussed in Part III, the current regulatory 
system gives insurers large amounts of discretion over their core business 
practices—for example, how they set rates, what types of coverage they 
offer, etc.
156
 Once insurers have unlimited access to data and analytics, it is 
reasonable to believe that they will begin to abuse this discretion and act in 
ways that threaten consumer autonomy. Why? First, such insurers will 
have much more information about what acts, characteristics, and qualities 
correlate with risk. As described earlier, market forces will drive them to 
use this information to discriminate among consumers or risk losing their 
low-risk customers to competitors.
157
 Second, technological advances will 
enable them to monitor policyholder behaviors at increasingly lower 
costs.
158
 
 
 
 153. It is common to see these types of promises in the endorsements that insurers regularly attach 
to the policies they issue to customers. Endorsements add additional terms to the policy, often 
expanding or limiting the coverage set forth in the policy or requiring that the policyholder take certain 
actions. A common example of the latter would be an endorsement for a property insurance policy that 
requires the policyholder maintain a sprinkler system on the property. See, e.g., Am. Way Cellular, 
Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 385 (Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Indus. Dev. 
Assoc. v. Commercial Union Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 536 A.2d 787, 789–90 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1988); Holz Rubber Co. v. Am. Star Ins. Co., 533 P.2d 1055, 1059–61 (Cal. 1975) (en banc); Port 
Blakely Mill Co. v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 106 P. 194, 194–96 (Wash. 1910). 
 154. See Theresa Williams, Note, “Going Bare”: Insurance and the Pre-existing Condition 
Problem, 15 J.L. & COM. 375, 375–77 (1995); Jennifer M. Franco, Note, Undermining the Protection 
of Health Insurance: The Preexisting Condition Clause, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 883, 883–87 (1996). 
 155. See Larry Cunningham, The Case Against Dog Breed Discrimination by Homeowners’ 
Insurance Companies, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 4–5, 11–17 (2005). 
 156. See infra Part III.A. 
 157. See Datoo, supra note 115; see also Jill Gaulding, Note, Race, Sex, and Genetic 
Discrimination in Insurance: What’s Fair?, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1646, 1651–53 (1995). 
 158. See Swedloff, supra note 4, at 342–43. 
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The data revolution will encourage insurers to take actions that will 
influence individuals’ decisions. Insurers can affect individuals directly 
(e.g., requiring applicants to take (or refrain from taking) certain actions as 
a prerequisite for coverage
159
) as well as indirectly (e.g., refusing to 
provide coverage to households with certain types of pets
160
 or setting 
incredibly high rates on homeowner’s insurance in certain 
neighborhoods).
161
 Using this power to compel some types of behavior, 
such as compliance with safety codes, is not objectionable. Advances in 
data science, however, will create incentives for insurers to reach far 
beyond this point. For instance, it is already the case that insurers issuing 
homeowner’s policies are considering whether they should mandate (or 
incentivize through discounts) the installation of certain forms of 
monitoring equipment in insured homes.
162
 It is easy to imagine that 
insurers in other lines are exploring similar policies.
163
 
Insurers compelling private conduct will have significant repercussions 
for consumers’ personal liberties. As the scope of conduct that is analyzed 
by insurers grows, the domain of conduct that can be regarded as personal 
(i.e., decisions that individuals are entitled to make free of coercion by the 
state or other external actors) will shrink. If the datafication of the world 
becomes as extensive as some have projected, then a sword of Damocles 
 
 
 159. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 106, at 210–12. 
 160. It is already the case that certain insurers will refuse to provide homeowner’s or renter’s 
insurance to individuals who own certain breeds of dogs (e.g., pitbulls). See Kari Huus, Dog Bite 
Liability Payouts Rise to $479 Million in 2011, MSNBC (May 22, 2012, 9:06 AM), 
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/05/22/11810821-dog-bite-liability-payouts-rise-to-479-millio 
n-in-2011?lite, archived at http://perma.cc/QX49-J7E5; Catey Hill, 11 Riskiest Dog Breeds for 
Homeowners and Renters, FORBES (May 30, 2012, 10:57 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
cateyhill/2012/05/30/11-riskiest-dog-breeds-for-homeowners-and-renters/. These insurers justify 
denying coverage to these individuals as a consequence of data analyses establishing that households 
with these types of dogs are much more likely than others to experience high value liability-related 
losses. See Cunningham, supra note 155, at 4–5, 11–17 (describing insurers’ justifications for breed 
discrimination). It should be noted, however, that the validity of such claims has been hotly contested. 
Id. at 11–17 (presenting data invalidating insurers’ claims). 
 161. Of course, it will often be the case that the public will not know what behaviors insurers’ 
pricing and underwriting algorithms consider relevant. In situations where they lack actual knowledge 
of insurers’ criteria, individuals’ actions could still be influenced, however, but with speculation or 
attempts to reverse engineer insurers’ algorithms taking the place of actual knowledge.  
 162. See ERNST & YOUNG, 2013 U.S. PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE OUTLOOK 5 (2012) 
(“While the automobile lines of business are the initial beneficiaries of Big Data, opportunities are 
emerging in homeowners insurance (among others), with video monitors, security systems and gaming 
systems all collecting and transmitting usable data.”). 
 163. This is particularly concerning given that private entities are not bound by the constitutional 
constraints that restrict state actors, allowing them to act in ways that governmental entities could not. 
See Laura K. Donohue, Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1059, 1142 (2006); Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 317, 320 (2008). 
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might loom over many personal decisions. One’s expressions of political 
views, whom one befriends or networks with, and other actions that have 
been regarded as wholly within the personal sphere could become affected 
by insurers’ views of these activities. 
The concern that Big Data analytics will have a coercive effect on 
personal decisions extends to areas of individuals’ lives that have a long 
history of being protected from outside influences. Religious affiliation or 
membership in political or social groups provide the most salient examples 
of such domains.
164
 Assume data analysis indicates that members of a 
certain societal subset (e.g., supporters of the Tea Party movement) have 
significantly higher than average auto risk profiles, while members of 
another group (e.g., Roman Catholics) have significantly lower than 
average risk profiles. Allowing price discrimination on the basis of 
political group or religious affiliation will create incentives that may 
influence the willingness of individuals who are members of either group 
to remain members or, at a minimum, may affect whether they publicly 
declare their membership.
165
 
Discrimination in accordance with elected group memberships could 
also have larger chilling impacts. Such discrimination may decrease the 
individuals’ willingness to partake in activities that are associated with 
groups commonly disfavored by insurers, as avoiding these activities 
would reduce the risk that insurers will classify them to their detriment.
166
 
Such effects would only be exacerbated by the fact that individuals will 
not have perfect knowledge of how insurers are making their 
determinations and, without definitive knowledge, will likely err on the 
side of behaving more conservatively. 
2. Anti-discrimination Norms 
Anti-discrimination norms are a second value that society expects 
markets to embody. It is a core tenet of modern society that discriminating 
among groups of individuals along certain types of criteria is morally 
wrong. The most obvious examples of this are characteristics that have 
 
 
 164. See Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the First Person Plural: Expressive Associations and the 
First Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483, 1497–1503 (2001). The growing literature on religious 
institutionalism also discusses the law’s protection of religious affiliation. See Zoë Robinson, What Is 
a “Religious Institution”?, 55 B.C. L. REV. 181 (2014). 
 165. See Jay Stanley, The Potential Chilling Effects of Big Data, ACLU BLOG (Apr. 30, 2012, 
11:46 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/potential-chilling-effects-big-data.  
 166. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss4/5
  
 
 
 
 
2016] CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA 893 
 
 
 
 
been recognized by the law as protected classes—gender,167 age,168 race,169 
sexual orientation,
170
 genetic composition,
171
 etc. Exactly which personal 
characteristics cannot be considered are determined by societal norms and 
vary across contexts. Whether discrimination against a member of a class 
is forbidden can vary across market sectors, as can the threshold for 
determining whether a business’s conduct is improper. Modern laws 
demonstrate our commitment to forcing markets to embrace anti-
discrimination norms—we prohibit race and gender discrimination in 
many contexts; we have prohibited price discrimination in the sale of 
consumer goods; etc.
172
 Within the realm of insurance markets, some 
states have limited insurers’ ability to discriminate on the basis of many 
characteristics, including: race, religion, national origin, age, gender, 
marital status, geographic location, disability, and sexual orientation.
173
 
Notably, several leading insurance scholars have criticized the existing set 
of anti-discrimination laws for being underinclusive.
174
 
For as long as there have been laws prohibiting insurers from 
discriminating on the basis of certain characteristics, there have been 
worries about whether insurers are actually complying with these laws.
175
 
 
 
 167. See, e.g., Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2014). 
 168. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2014). 
 169. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2014). 
 170. See, e.g., Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/1-102 (2015). 
 171. See, e.g., Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff–2000ff-11 
(2014). 
 172. See Joshua Block, Businesses Do Not Have a License to Discriminate, ACLU (Dec. 18, 2012, 
4:24 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/lgbt-rights-free-speech-religion-belief/businesses-do-not-have-
license-discriminate (describing state public accommodation laws); Bill Davidow, Redlining for the 
21st Century, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/ 
2014/03/redlining-for-the-21st-century/284235/, archived at http://perma.cc/C2JC-MCZP (describing 
prohibitions against redlining and how Big Data could lead to unfair discrimination in the commercial 
sector). 
 173. See Ronen Avraham et al., Understanding Insurance Antidiscrimination Laws, 87 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 195, 232–62 (2014) (collecting state anti-discrimination laws). 
 174. See id. at 197–99, 267 (“Our findings reveal various discrepancies between the reality of 
state insurance antidiscrimination law and the largely theoretical literature on the topic. . . . [S]uch 
laws often have little to say about the most important and divisive types of discrimination: distinctions 
based on race, national origin, or religion.”). 
 175. See, e.g., Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 
517 (1983) (discussing general tactics insurers can use to discriminate without violating anti-
discrimination laws); Alan I. Widiss, To Insure or Not to Insure Persons Infected with the Virus that 
Causes AIDS, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1617, 1658–64 (1992) (describing how insurers could legally 
discriminate against sexual and racial minorities via HIV testing); Robert Pear, Health Insurers 
Skirting New Law, Officials Report, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1997, at 1, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/1997/10/05/us/health-insurers-skirting-new-law-officials-report.html?pagewanted=all, archived 
at http://perma.cc/72WP-SSGJ (describing how health insurers were able to skirt laws intended to 
protect sick individuals). 
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The primary concern has not been that insurers will directly discriminate 
against individuals on the basis of their membership in a protected class. 
Rather, it has been that insurers’ underwriting analyses will include factors 
that correlate extremely highly with a protected class, leading to indirect 
discrimination against members of protected classes.
176
 
Given that violations of anti-discrimination norms are already a 
concern in the status quo, it is fair to question whether data-saturated 
insurers will pose any sort of additional danger.
177
 They will. The 
increased use of expansive data sets and analytics will make it 
substantially more difficult for insurers to comply with anti-discrimination 
laws.
178
 It will also make it substantially more difficult for both the state 
and private citizens to police their conduct.
179
  
As insurers begin to delegate decision-making authority to algorithms, 
it will become increasingly difficult for anyone to determine whether an 
insurer is engaging in illegal discrimination. In underwriting, insurers’ 
algorithms will calculate the likelihood of loss by analyzing data 
containing a near infinitude of risk-correlated characteristics and 
composites of characteristics.
180
 Such algorithms will constantly evolve 
over time—automatically modifying the weight attributed to different 
factors as new data comes in, adding or removing factors that it determines 
are relevant or irrelevant, etc.
181
 It is easy to see how indirect 
discrimination against protected classes could occur in this type of 
decision-making environment. For instance, an insurer’s rate setting 
formula could violate race-based discrimination prohibitions if one of its 
components increases premium prices for individuals whose retail history 
 
 
 176. See, e.g., Katy Chi-Wen Li, The Private Insurance Industry’s Tactics Against Suspected 
Homosexuals: Redlining Based on Occupation, Residence and Marital Status, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 
477 (1996); Willy E. Rice, Race, Gender, “Redlining,” and the Discriminatory Access to Loans, 
Credit, and Insurance, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 583, 609–16 (1996). 
 177. For a thorough analysis of Big Data, consumer categorization, and unfair discrimination, see 
Tal Z. Zarsky, Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1385–
411 (2014).  
 178. See Swedloff, supra note 4, at 360–68, 370–71. 
 179. Id. 
 180. As discussed earlier, insurers have begun to use algorithms to guide their claims handling 
processes, which would raise similar discrimination concerns. See supra Part II.A. 
 181. Automated data analysis of this type is commonly referred to as “machine learning.” The use 
of machine learning approaches for model building is becoming increasingly common in the 
commercial sector. See Thomas H. Davenport, Industrial-Strength Analytics with Machine Learning, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 11, 2013, 12:12 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2013/09/11/industrial-strength-
analytics-with-machine-learning/, archived at http://perma.cc/6KT3-QTDD. 
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contained products that are nearly exclusively purchased by members of a 
particular race.
182
 
As automated data analyses generate increasingly complex algorithms, 
it will become more and more difficult to police insurers’ actions and 
ensure that they are complying with anti-discrimination laws. While it is 
possible to look at the set of factors that inform insurers’ non-algorithmic 
underwriting decisions and decide whether they impermissibly track a 
protected class, it will become increasingly difficult to do this in the 
future.
183
 Further, given that the components of insurers’ underwriting and 
pricing algorithms will be generated by software, it will be possible (and, 
perhaps, likely) that insurers themselves will be unaware of what qualities 
they take into account when making underwriting and claims handling 
decisions.
184
 
3. Equality Norms 
A third measure that insurance markets are evaluated on is the extent to 
which they mitigate (or exacerbate) unjust inequalities among individuals. 
Modern moral norms require society to help mitigate the advantages and 
disadvantages individuals experience that cannot fairly be attributed to 
their choices—that is, those benefits or harms they experience due to luck 
or lack thereof.
185
 While the mitigation of misfortune is not a value that 
most markets are expected to maximize, the unique nature of the interests 
at play in insurance markets make it a legitimate evaluative criterion. The 
core function of insurance is to protect individuals from fortuitous (i.e., 
non-meritorious) losses. In doing so, insurance inherently prevents the 
growth of luck-based inequalities. States’ expectations that insurance 
 
 
 182. See Dana L. Kaersvang, Note, The Fair Housing Act and Disparate Impact in Homeowners 
Insurance, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1993, 2013–17 (2006) (describing how this problem exists in the 
homeowners’ insurance market). There are currently two ongoing suits challenging whether insurers 
can be held liable under disparate impact claims in the context of homeowners policies. See Prop. Cas. 
Insurers Ass’n of Am. v. Donovan, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1018 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Hous. & Urban Dev., 74 F. Supp. 3d 30 (D.D.C. 2014).   
 183. Swedloff, supra note 4, at 370–71 (describing the types of analyses regulatory bodies would 
have to perform to detect this form of discrimination); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s 
Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 43) (“Data mining allows 
employers who wish to discriminate on the basis of a protected class to disclaim any knowledge of the 
protected class in the first instance . . . .”). 
 184. Swedloff, supra note 4, at 363 (“The far more likely scenario is that it will not be readily 
apparent to anyone why some individuals are charged more. The algorithms driving big data will 
simply spit out higher prices for some policyholders than others.”). 
 185. See CARL KNIGHT, LUCK EGALITARIANISM: EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND JUSTICE 
(2009); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11–17 (1971) (describing modern conceptions about the 
relationship of justice, desert, and morality). 
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markets will serve this role are reflected in laws mandating that all 
individuals have access to different types of insurance coverage and 
restricting insurers’ ability to discriminate against the unlucky.186 
Giving insurers free rein to pursue actuarial fairness would injure 
society’s ability to mitigate the advantages and disadvantages that people 
have due to luck and their starting positions in life. When insurers analyze 
larger and larger sets of data, they will uncover more and more qualities 
that correlate with risk.
187
 Many of the individual qualities that are 
identified as increasing the likelihood that a policyholder will experience a 
loss will be characteristics that most would consider to be immutable, 
luck-based, or otherwise non-elected. Inclusion of these characteristics 
into insurers’ operational algorithms would result in differential treatment 
on the basis of fortuitous factors. 
Why such practices violate fairness norms can be demonstrated 
through a hypothetical. Assume the existence of two individuals—Jane 
and Janet—who are identical in every aspect except for the fact that Jane 
is five feet tall and Janet is six feet tall. Further assume that extensive data 
analyses have established that a person’s height is strongly correlated with 
the likelihood that they will file auto insurance claims. If Jane and Janet 
request quotes from an auto insurer, that insurer will have to decide 
whether they should offer Jane a lower rate than Janet to account for the 
height-related discrepancy in their risk profiles. While many might feel as 
though it would be acceptable to charge Jane and Janet slightly different 
amounts to account for the increased likelihood that Janet will file a claim, 
this intuition weakens as the proposed price differential increases. Support 
for allowing discrimination on the basis of height dissipates further if the 
issue shifts to insurers refusing to offer coverage to tall individuals 
altogether. The contagious nature of insurer behavior exacerbates the 
threat posed by such practices. As discussed earlier, even if an insurer 
initially has qualms about discriminating against individuals on the basis 
of height, once other insurers begin to do so, market forces will drive them 
to follow suit to remain competitive.
188
 
This situation is particularly disconcerting because many of the 
qualities that would lead insurers to confer beneficial treatment to an 
individual are not merely qualities indicative of a low-risk profile, but are 
 
 
 186. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I) (2014) (prohibiting health insurers from refusing to sell 
coverage to individuals); Avraham et al., supra note 173, at 232–62 (discussing limitations on insurers’ 
ability to discriminate against consumers). 
 187. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 188. See Gaulding, supra note 157, at 1651–53; Swedloff, supra note 4, at 359–60. 
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also qualities that cause one to receive more favorable treatment across 
social institutions.
189
 Similarly, qualities that would cause insurers to 
discriminate against an individual are not simply indicia of riskiness, but 
are often characteristics that leave one more broadly disadvantaged in 
society.
190
 For instance, we can easily imagine that it could be the case that 
individuals growing up in high-crime, high-poverty areas have higher risk 
profiles than individuals growing up in low-crime, low-poverty areas. If 
these qualities are highly predictive of future loss, insurers will begin to 
exacerbate, rather than mitigate, the impact that place of birth and other 
unelected characteristics have on individuals’ lives. 
Discriminating among individuals along such characteristics will 
further privilege the fortunate and further disadvantage the unfortunate. 
While insurers’ practices already take some of these types of 
characteristics into account when making pricing and underwriting 
decisions, the data revolution could drastically expand the number of 
qualities that factor into an individual’s ability to procure insurance.191 To 
the extent that society is committed to mitigating the advantages and 
disadvantages that people have due to luck, this goal will be undermined if 
insurers are given free rein in a post-data revolution world.  
4. Utility Maximization, Privacy, and Good Faith Norms 
Finally, insurance markets can be evaluated on the extent to which they 
impair societal utility maximization, intrude on consumer privacy, and 
injure good faith norms. As established earlier, expansions in insurers’ 
data faculties will allow them to learn more about what qualities correlate 
with risk, as well as enhance their abilities to collect data, monitor 
policyholders, and influence consumers’ behaviors.192 When insurers gain 
these capabilities, competitive forces will lead companies to use their 
power in ways that harm utilitarian, privacy, and dignitary interests. 
Basic economic theory assumes that an actor will consider the expected 
benefits and costs of taking an action and choose the course of action that 
maximizes their utility. This model of behavior does not accurately 
describe the behaviors of individuals that are subject to the control of 
insurers. Insurers benefit from incentivizing behavior that is risk-
 
 
 189. See BIG DATA REPORT I, supra note 9, at 46–47 (expressing concern that businesses using 
analytics to discriminate among customers will hurt the least well-off). 
 190. Id. 
 191. See Swedloff, supra note 4, at 348–51.  
 192. See generally supra Part II.A.  
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minimizing, with little sensitivity to the costs that risk-minimization 
imposes on their policyholders. Hence, when insurers have the ability to 
influence the behavior of their customers, they will push policyholders to 
act in ways that do not maximize overall societal utility.
193
 
This effect can best be illustrated through examples. Consider the 
owner of a commercial storage facility who is debating whether she should 
install a video surveillance system around the exterior of her facility. In 
making such a decision, she would consider her potential savings from the 
enhanced deterrence of theft, the expense of installation and maintenance, 
and other factors. If the expected benefits outweighed the costs, she would 
install the system; if they did not, she would not. This calculus is 
significantly different if we adopt the perspective of an insurer deciding 
whether to force the storage facility owner to install the surveillance 
system.
194
 While the primary benefit associated with installation of the 
cameras applies to the insurer, the main cost is not something that they 
will have to bear. Requiring installation could have a cost to the insurer—
it could cause the policyholder to seek coverage elsewhere or forego 
coverage altogether—but only if coverage is not necessary or if there are 
insurers who will offer coverage on different terms. 
Alternatively, consider the differences between insurers’ and 
individuals’ interests when it comes to highly risky recreational or 
commercial activities like base jumping, bull running, or working in a coal 
mine. These activities generate enough utility for some individuals that 
they will choose to engage in them despite their inherent risks—that is, the 
activities are efficient from the individual’s perspective. Insurers see such 
behaviors in a much different light—they are activities that the vast 
majority of people have little interest in and that greatly increase the 
likelihood that the insurer will have to pay a substantial claim. From the 
perspective of an insurer, excluding these types of losses from coverage is 
likely to be efficiency maximizing—it decreases payout risk without 
alienating a significant subset of consumers.
195
 The personal utility losses 
that risk-loving individuals would experience by foregoing these activities 
play no role in the insurers’ calculations; only the marginal decrease in 
customer volume would be relevant to them. If losses from highly risky 
 
 
 193. See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic 
Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 166 n.155 (1990). 
 194. Such requirements are not uncommon. See discussion supra note 153. 
 195. Further, the individuals who are most likely to be driven away from the adoption of such 
exclusions are those who regularly engage in high-risk activities. Under most conditions, having fewer 
of such individuals in a pool of policyholders will actually be financially advantageous for insurers. 
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recreational and commercial activities are uniformly excluded from 
insurance coverage, it will discourage at least some individuals from 
maximizing their personal utility, resulting in a net societal loss in 
utility.
196
 
Additionally, insurers’ embrace of Big Data analytics will lead to 
expansions in data collection and surveillance and harm individuals’ 
privacy interests. Because insurers have the potential to derive direct 
monetary benefits from all sorts of personal data, they have strong 
incentives to expand the types of information that they collect about 
individuals. As the costs associated with procuring data decrease, insurers 
will attempt to gather this data themselves—for example, by installing 
telematics devices into individuals’ cars197 or cameras within insured 
properties.
198
 Their hunger for data and willingness to purchase it from 
third parties will also incentivize other businesses to be more aggressive in 
collecting new forms of data.
199
 The former practices are particularly 
dangerous because, as will be discussed in Part III, insurers often have 
significant leverage over consumers, which they could exploit to get 
individuals to consent to invasive data collection measures.
200
 
As more and more aspects of their lives are monitored, consumers’ 
cognizance that they are constantly being watched, recorded, and 
evaluated by private entities will grow. Concerns about the evolution of a 
national surveillance state—with private and public entities doing the 
watching—have already begun to appear in academic articles and the 
popular media.
201
 Simply knowing that insurers are observing their social 
 
 
 196. For a similar point about insurers’ interests in the context of malpractice insurance, see 
Swedloff, supra note 4, at 347. 
 197. See CORBETT ET AL., supra note 5, at 6. 
 198. See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 162, at 5 (“[O]pportunities are emerging in 
homeowners insurance (among others), with video monitors, security systems and gaming systems all 
collecting and transmitting usable data.”). 
 199. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 1, at 124–27, 132 (describing the growth 
of data broker and data analysis markets); EARNIX & INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 5, at 16 
(presenting data establishing that the majority of insurers already use external data to inform their 
decisions). 
 200. Interestingly, private regulators getting individuals to divulge information to them would 
likely foreclose individuals’ ability to prevent the government from getting access to that information, 
due to limitations on the Fourth Amendment. See Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: 
Why the Third Party Doctrine Should Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 8–14 (2013). 
 201. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 1, 13–17 (2008) (arguing that the growth of data collection poses three threats to citizens’ 
freedom); Richards & King, supra note 35, at 408; Eric Posner, We All Have the Right to Be 
Forgotten, SLATE (May 14, 2014, 4:37 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_ 
from_chicago/2014/05/the_european_right_to_be_forgotten_is_just_what_the_internet_needs.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/4SBA-RVG9 (describing technological threats to privacy). 
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conduct will cause many individuals to experience anxiety or suffer other 
mental harms.
202
 These anxieties will be greatly amplified if it is clear that 
the data are being used to determine individuals’ ability to procure 
insurance. 
Finally, insurers that adopt the new wave of analytics will be 
incentivized to engage in claims handling practices that violate widely 
held good faith norms. The idea that both parties in a contractual 
relationship have an obligation to fully perform their end of the bargain is 
one of the fundamental ideas in modern society.
203
 When insurers are 
handling policyholders’ claims, they possess a large amount of 
discretion—they can cover the entire amount of the claimed loss, they can 
offer the policyholder less than this as a settlement, or they can deny the 
claim. There have always been concerns that insurers abuse this discretion 
to get policyholders to accept payouts that are less than they should 
receive—consumers’ lack of knowledge, high transaction costs, and the 
absence of sanctions create an environment where it is easy for insurers to 
shirk their contractual duties.
204
 This dynamic will only become 
exacerbated when insurers have more personal data about their consumers. 
This knowledge, when combined with an insurer’s claims handling 
records, will enable insurers to predict which policyholders are most 
susceptible to this type of exploitation and how far below claim value their 
settlement offers should be.  
 
 
 202. See, e.g., ELOÏSE GRATTON, UNDERSTANDING PERSONAL INFORMATION: MANAGING 
PRIVACY RISKS 229 (2013); John Borland, Maybe Surveillance Is Bad, After All, WIRED (Aug. 8, 
2007, 5:55 AM), http://www.wired.com/2007/08/maybe-surveilla/, archived at http://perma.cc/YL4P-
KZT9; Jillian C. York, The Chilling Effects of Surveillance, AL JAZEERA (June 25, 2013), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/201362574347243214.html, archived at http://per 
ma.cc/U9ER-CB8D. 
 203. See Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality Approach to the 
Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1025, 1033 (2003) (footnotes omitted) 
(“The implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing has been adopted by the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts, is implied into every contract governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, and in most 
jurisdictions is implied into every contract at common law.”); James A. Webster, Comment, A Pound 
of Flesh: The Oregon Supreme Court Virtually Eliminates the Duty to Perform and Enforce Contracts 
in Good Faith, 75 OR. L. REV. 493, 497–509 (1996) (discussing the history of the good faith 
contractual obligation). 
 204. See, e.g., Steven Plitt & Christie L. Kriegsfeld, The Punitive Damages Lottery Chase Is 
Over: Is There a Regulatory Alternative to the Tort of Common Law Bad Faith and Does It Provide an 
Alternative Deterrent?, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1221, 1285–87 (2005) (discussing insurers’ economic 
incentives to shirk).  
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D. Summary 
Unfortunately, there are no simple answers about whether the data 
revolution will have a positive or negative impact on the insurance 
industry. As outlined above, an ideal insurance market would promote a 
number of values—actuarial fairness, loss reduction, autonomy, non-
discrimination, justice, utility maximization, privacy, and good faith.
205
 
Because the quality of a market does not depend upon its performance 
along a single dimension, evaluating whether a market change will have a 
net beneficial or detrimental effect is incredibly difficult. There is no easy 
way to know how advances in some values should be weighed against 
decreases in others. This is a problem that is common whenever one 
attempts to evaluate a system that is expected to pursue incommensurable 
values.  
In addition to this incommensurability problem, there are two other 
dynamics that complicate the evaluation of changes in insurance markets. 
First, some of the values that insurance markets are expected to embrace 
are fundamentally incompatible. For instance, anti-discrimination norms 
and actuarial fairness become incompatible values when data establishes 
that different protected classes have different risk profiles. Hence, it is 
impossible for a system to avoid trading one value off against another. 
Second, the diversity of insurance markets makes it difficult to generalize 
about the relative worth of different values. Some characteristics are more 
important in certain lines of insurance, while others are of primary 
importance in different lines.
206
 Despite all of these difficulties, however, 
decisions about how the regulatory system should respond to changes in 
the industry must be made. 
III. MEETING THE REGULATORY CHALLENGE: MODERATING INSURERS’ 
USES OF DATA  
The preceding discussion of how advances in data technology will 
change the insurance industry was premised on an assumption of 
regulatory stasis. It is unlikely, however, that the state will refrain from 
constraining private entities’ use of predictive analytics. Indeed, there are a 
number of governmental bodies that have made initial efforts in this area. 
 
 
 205. This list is not meant to be comprehensive. There are unquestionably other market values that 
could be identified; however, these are the ones that are most obviously implicated by insurers’ 
adoption of Big Data practices. 
 206. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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This Part begins by providing an overview of the regulatory status quo and 
highlighting its shortcomings when it comes to controlling private entities’ 
use of predictive analytics. It goes on to describe the normative goals of 
regulating insurers’ use of predictive analytics, which leads to a discussion 
of the significantly different interests raised by the use of data in consumer 
and commercial lines of insurance. Finally, it sets forth regulatory reforms 
that the state could use to ensure that insurance markets operate in a 
socially optimal manner. 
A. The Current State of Insurance Regulation and Big Data 
Insurance regulation is predominantly a matter of state law. Regulation 
primarily occurs through each state’s department of insurance, which 
promulgates rules, administers various compliance-related programs, and 
generally oversees the market. State legislatures also play a part by 
enacting general business and insurance specific laws. The federal 
government’s involvement in insurance matters has traditionally been very 
limited, due in large part to the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945.
207
 This 
may be changing, however, as many of the largest federal laws enacted 
over the past decade have imposed regulations on national insurance 
markets.
208
 
Regulation of insurers’ marketing practices has been primarily 
concerned with ensuring that advertising materials are not misleading to 
consumers, mandating the inclusion of disclaimers, and prohibiting certain 
sales practices (e.g., offering consumers financial inducements, using 
misleading endorsements or testimonials).
209
 These requirements vary 
substantially from state to state and across coverage lines.
210
 At the federal 
level, statutes have been enacted that govern firms’ marketing behaviors in 
general, and the Federal Trade Commission has been granted the authority 
to regulate all business entities’ sales practices, including those of 
insurance companies.
211
 
 
 
 207. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2014) (limiting the extent to which federal laws apply to the 
insurance industry). 
 208. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 31 U.S.C. § 313 
(2014); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 1201, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–152, 124 
Stat. 1029 (2010) (amending § 2701(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the Public Health Service Act). 
 209. See, e.g., KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §§ 40-9-1, 40-9-100 (2015); 304 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 12-020 
(2015); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 400-5.100 (2015). 
 210. See sources cited supra note 209. 
 211. See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.); Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, 15 U.S.C. 
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In the context of pricing and underwriting, the little regulation that 
exists tends to focus on prohibiting insurers from looking at specific types 
of personal information when making underwriting decisions or, 
alternatively, putting conditions on when and how insurers can use such 
information. For instance, many states have enacted measures that prevent 
casualty insurers from using data about the location of an individual’s 
residence (i.e., redlining).
212
 Similarly, many states force insurers who 
wish to consider individuals’ credit scores during the underwriting process 
to obtain consumers’ consent and restrict how that data can be used.213 
While it is common for states to require insurers that sell certain lines of 
coverage to obtain approval for rate increases or changes in underwriting 
criteria, regulators have been lax in exercising their authority in this 
area.
214
 Outside of the context of health insurance, they have primarily 
used their power to prevent severe across-the-board rate hikes, not to 
control the factors that companies analyze when making underwriting 
decisions or modifying their policies.
215
 
Finally, most states have asserted some level of control over insurers’ 
claims handling procedures. Most commonly, this involves the regulatory 
body creating a list of standards that insurers must comply with when they 
interact with policyholders concerning claims. Examples of such standards 
include requiring insurance companies to respond to policyholder 
communications with reasonable promptness, prohibiting insurers from 
knowingly misrepresenting facts to policyholders, and forbidding insurers 
from forcing policyholders to institute lawsuits to recover amounts due 
under their policies.
216
 
What is crucial to note is that neither the states nor the federal 
government have enacted rules that directly restrict how insurers 
 
 
§ 13 (2014). 
 212. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35800-35833 (2015); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/522 to /525 (2015); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 2187 (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 135.07 (LexisNexis 2015). 
 213. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.2153 (2015); IOWA CODE § 515.103 (2015); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 686A.700 (2014). 
 214. BAKER, supra note 123, at 47 (stating that substantive review of policy content is typically 
perfunctory); Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. 
L. REV. 961, 966–67 (1970) (same). 
 215. See Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1263, 1271 (2011); see also, e.g., 50 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 754.10 (2015) (permitting insurers to use an 
altered version of a policy if the state Commissioner has not affirmatively rejected the proposed 
changes).  
 216. See, e.g., 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/154.6 (2014) (requiring insurers to comply with a list of 
claims handling standards); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2601 (McKinney 2015) (same); 31 PA. CODE § 146.1 et 
seq. (2014) (same).  
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incorporate Big Data methodologies into their core operations. None of the 
rules that are presently in effect were created to address the problems that 
may result from technological advances vastly expanding insurers’ 
analytic capabilities. For the vast majority of insurance lines, there is 
nothing limiting the amount of data that insurers can collect about 
individuals and there are very few limits placed on how insurers use this 
information. 
Despite the obvious privacy concerns raised by the data revolution, 
legal controls concerning the collection, sale, and use of personal data 
have only just begun to be developed. The closest that governmental 
entities have come to addressing these issues are discussions about 
developing data privacy laws that would regulate private entities’ 
collection and use of personal information. The FTC has issued Fair 
Information Protection Principles (“FIPPs”), which are guidelines 
concerning commercial entities’ uses of personal data.217 Some have 
viewed FIPPs as the government’s attempt to regulate businesses’ use of 
Big Data,
218
 but the principles are mere recommendations as to how 
private entities should act.
219
 While the FTC has recommended that the 
federal legislature enact laws that will set standards that are enforceable by 
law, no such scheme has been passed.
220
 
B. The Normative Goals of Regulation 
Before describing how the current regulatory system could be changed 
to address the concerns raised by Big Data, it is imperative to determine 
the goals that such interventions are meant to achieve. Discussing 
prospective reforms prior to resolving this antecedent normative question 
would not only be theoretically unsatisfactory, but also would lead to 
 
 
 217. See infra note 220. 
 218. See, e.g., Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 2, at 242. 
 219. THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK 
FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY (2012), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf; FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012), available at http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyrepo 
rt.pdf. 
 220. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE 
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE iii (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/ 
privacy2000.pdf. Some scholars have argued that the FTC should assume a primary role in regulating 
commercial entities’ uses of Big Data. See Dennis S. Hirsch, That’s Unfair! Or Is It? Big Data, 
Discrimination and the FTC’s Unfairness Authority, 103 KY. L.J. 345 (2014–2015); Rory Van Loo, 
Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1331–34 
(2015). 
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proposals that do a suboptimal job of advancing the public’s interests. At a 
very general level, the ideal regulatory system would protect individuals 
from the harms associated with insurers embracing advanced data 
practices without impairing society’s ability to reap the concomitant 
benefits with as little market disruption as possible. 
As Part II demonstrated, it is possible to identify the major societal 
interests that are in play when it comes to insurance in the post-data 
revolution world. The benefits associated with expansive data use are 
clear. Advanced analytics will maximize companies’ predictive abilities, 
allowing them to price coverage in ways that are actuarially fair to 
consumers. This will create additional benefits for the public, as it will 
help combat the adverse selection and moral hazard problems that have 
weakened insurance markets. Additionally, allowing insurers to engage in 
data-informed discrimination will enable them to discover what behaviors 
correlate with losses and incentivize private parties to take cost-efficient 
loss prevention measures.  
The drawbacks to granting insurers carte blanche when it comes to data 
collection and use are equally apparent. Doing so will permit insurers to 
discriminate against classes of individuals that the law seeks to protect. It 
would also allow insurers to impose requirements or institute pricing 
practices that would constrain individual autonomy. To the extent that risk 
of loss correlates with immutable characteristics or fortuitous events, a 
failure to regulate will lead to practices that exacerbate the impact that 
these factors have on individuals’ lives. Finally, it could lead to levels of 
risk deterrence that are inefficient at the societal level and allow severe 
intrusions into consumers’ private lives. 
Given the conflicting nature of these considerations, it is legitimate to 
question whether there is a principled way to evaluate regulatory 
proposals. It is true that any weighting of these different values will be 
based on the evaluator’s idiosyncratic preferences. There are, however, 
some broader potential claims that are rooted in judgments that most 
individuals would share. It is this set of claims that shed light on the goals 
of regulation. 
One intuition is that the consumer and commercial lines of insurance 
are significantly different from one another and therefore raise different 
regulatory concerns. Individuals are often compelled (by the law or by 
necessity) to procure certain types of coverage, yet the availability of 
coverage is usually left to the discretion of private companies.
221
 This 
 
 
 221. See STEMPEL ET AL., supra note 89, at 2–3; Erik S. Knutsen, Auto Insurance as Social 
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gives insurance companies incredible leverage over consumers.
222
 While 
commercial entities can face similar issues, they may have greater 
bargainging power and be in much better positions to work around any 
problems they encounter. Further, many of the values that weigh in favor 
of heavier regulation have little applicability in the context of 
policyholders that are not individuals.
223
  
One of the characteristics of insurance that distinguishes it from other 
types of goods and services is the extent to which insurance products 
constitute necessities or near necessities. In many contexts, possessing 
insurance coverage is a practical necessity.
224
 Legal requirements such as 
state compulsory auto insurance laws
225
 and the Affordable Care Act’s 
individual health mandate require that individuals carry certain forms of 
insurance.
226
 Other types of coverage are effectively mandatory 
prerequisites for engaging in certain types of actions. For example, 
commercial lenders require that an individual seeking a mortgage loan 
obtain homeowner’s and title insurance.227 And then there are lines of 
coverage that are practical necessities for all but the most affluent, such as 
life, disability, or renter’s insurance. While there may not be external 
entities that require these coverages, they are commonly considered to be 
near necessities given individuals’ aversion to catastrophic risk.228 
Often there are no functional substitutes for what consumer insurance 
products provide. First, in situations where possession of insurance is a 
legal or contractual requirement, substitutes cannot exist.
229
 In other 
 
 
Contract: Solving Automobile Insurance Coverage Disputes Through a Public Regulatory Framework, 
48 ALTA. L. REV. 715 (2011); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and 
Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1497–99 (2010).  
 222. Some might object that competition from other insurers would prevent insurers from having 
such leverage and that, if competition were fierce enough, it would be consumers with leverage over 
insurers. The history of insurance markets, unfortunately, has established that such levels of 
competition are rarely (if ever) present and that insurers have experienced great success in imposing 
their terms and conditions on customers. See French, supra note 143, at 1096–107 (describing several 
instances where insurers have acted in concert to exclude specific types of losses from coverage). 
 223. See generally supra Part I.C. 
 224. See STEMPEL ET AL., supra note 89, at 2–3.  
 225. See EMMETT J. VAUGHAN & THERESE VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 
539–41 (8th ed. 1999) (fifty-state survey of auto insurance mandates). 
 226. 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2014); 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2014). 
 227. See Stempel, supra note 221, at 1497–98. 
 228. See, e.g., Alena Allen, State-Mandated Disability Insurance as Salve to the Consumer 
Bankruptcy Imbroglio, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1327, 1343 (2011); Nancy Kass & Amy Medley, Genetic 
Screening and Disability Insurance: What Can We Learn from the Health Insurance Experience?, 35 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 66, 71 (2007); Kyle D. Logue, The Current Life Insurance Crisis: How the Law 
Should Respond, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2001). 
 229. See Stempel, supra note 221, at 1497–98. 
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contexts, insurance is the only way that an individual can effectively 
protect herself against risk.
230
 Term life insurance provides an example of 
this type of coverage. Consider a non-affluent individual who is seeking to 
make sure that her family would be provided for if she dies unexpectedly. 
If she cannot purchase life insurance, then there is no way for her to 
combat this risk. She cannot effectively self-insure, as there is no way that 
she could set aside a sufficient amount of money. While she could take 
steps to try to reduce the likelihood that the risk will manifest—for 
example, driving carefully, exercising regularly, etc.—there is nothing she 
can do to completely eliminate the chance that she will die unexpectedly. 
Insurance coverage is her only option. Similar stories can be told for long-
term disability, health, and other types of coverage. These lines provide 
the only way (other than social welfare programs) that many individuals 
can protect themselves and their families against catastrophic losses. 
The fact that insurance coverage is often a necessity and that there are 
usually no substitutes for it is important because it confers significant 
power to insurers. As the exclusive providers of a product that is both 
highly sought after and difficult to replace, insurance companies possess a 
greater ability to set the terms of their deals than many other commercial 
entities. This advantage has served as one of the traditional justifications 
for increased governmental regulation of insurance markets.
231
 While state 
regulation and competition among insurers has helped to curb abuses in 
the past, they have also failed to prevent egregious systemic problems.
232
 
Failures in consumer insurance markets are particularly harmful, as 
individuals do not have the option of simply exiting the market when 
regulatory and competitive forces fail to keep insurers in check. 
Essentially, this dynamic places insurance consumers in the role of 
 
 
 230. See Allen, supra note 228, at 1343; Logue, supra note 228, at 1–2. 
 231. See, e.g., Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy, 
and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 930; Daniel Schwarcz, A Products 
Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 
1404–07, 1422–25 (2007). 
 232. See Merrick v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 594 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1170–76 (D. Nev. 2008) 
(providing an account of UNUM Provident’s disability claim handling practices); Campbell v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1147–50 (Utah 2001) (discussing State Farm’s abusive 
claims handling practices); RAY BOURHIS, INSULT TO INJURY: INSURANCE, FRAUD, AND THE BIG 
BUSINESS OF BAD FAITH (2005) (describing what litigation uncovered regarding the bad faith practices 
that were rampant at a leading disability insurance company); FEINMAN, supra note 89 (reviewing a 
multitude of ways that insurers have shortchanged policyholders); Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability for 
Bad Faith and the Principle Without a Name (Yet), 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 4–7 (2012) (discussing the 
largest publicly known incidents of insurers acting in bad faith); Joseph B. Treaster, Broker Accused of 
Rigging Bids for Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2004, at A1 (describing AIG’s illegal payments to 
insurance brokers). 
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captives who must accept the terms and conditions set by insurance 
companies and governmental regulatory bodies. 
The foregoing is not meant to suggest that insurance is always a 
discretionary good for commercial entities. For instance, financial 
institutions and local permitting boards often impose proof of liability 
insurance requirements on businesses that they deal with.
233
 What 
mitigates the significance of these concerns in the commercial sphere is 
the extent to which businesses are able to work around insurance-related 
issues. They typically have a greater capacity to self-insure, negotiate with 
insurers and political bodies, or take other actions that will resolve 
conflicts (e.g., relocate, abandon problematic activities). 
While the above considerations indicate that regulators should police 
consumer markets more heavily than commercial markets, a final 
distinguishing factor sheds light on what values regulatory measures 
should focus on. If one considers the importance that the market values 
identified earlier assume in consumer and commercial markets, a divide 
becomes apparent. All of the values are factors that one would need to 
consider when making regulatory decisions about consumer markets. The 
same is not true for commercial markets. 
Many of the concerns that weigh in favor of extensive regulation have 
little applicability when policyholders are not actual individuals. It would 
be odd to take umbrage with insurers infringing upon businesses’ 
autonomy or privacy rights, as companies are not considered to have the 
protected spheres of personal liberty and privacy that individuals 
possess.
234
 Rather, scholars have often celebrated insurers conduct-forcing 
capabilities in the commercial sphere, ascribing improvements in product 
and worker safety to such efforts.
235
 The relevance of anti-discrimination 
and justice norms in commercial markets is similarly suspect. Society has 
expressed little concern about private entities discriminating against other 
private entities and, further, businesses can only indirectly possess the 
types of qualities that have been granted statutory protection.  
 
 
 233. See GEORGE E. REJDA, PRINCIPLES OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 556 (9th ed. 
2005). 
 234. See FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 409–10 (2011) (holding that corporations do not have 
privacy rights under the Freedom of Information Act); Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 
255 (1906) (“The liberty referred to in [the Fourteenth Amendment] is the liberty of natural, not 
artificial persons.”).  
 235. See, e.g., Baker & Swedloff, supra note 142, at 1418–22 (describing how insurers can 
regulate policyholders’ behaviors to reduce risk of loss); Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 106, at 198–
202 (same).  
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What conclusions can be drawn from these insights? First, regulators 
should be primarily concerned with regulating insurers’ uses of data in the 
segments of the market that deal with consumers. Many of the harms 
associated with expanded use of analytics are inapplicable to commercial 
entities. Indeed, regulators should avoid instituting rules for corporate 
insurance markets as doing so will reduce the actuarial fairness and loss 
reduction benefits generated by these practices. Second, when it comes to 
consumer markets, there are real trade-offs between permissive and 
restrictive regulatory approaches. Given the impossibility of assigning 
objective weights to the market values that will be affected by insurers’ 
uses of advanced analytics, regulators will need to develop an approach 
that strikes an optimal balance across different evaluative perspectives. 
C. The Future of Regulation 
There are two key questions that all serious discussions of regulatory 
reform must address—is it realistic to think that reforms could be enacted 
and, if so, what types of regulation would best advance public interests? 
While it is impossible to definitively answer either question, recent 
developments in the insurance world provide insight into both issues. The 
federal government has taken a number of actions—most notably, the 
passage of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)—that demonstrate a 
willingness to assert regulatory authority over private entities’ data 
practices and insurance markets. The reforms contained within the ACA 
are particularly helpful, as they provide a template for how balanced 
approaches to consumer protection in insurance markets could be 
structured.
236
 
1. The Possibility of Federal Involvement in Insurance Markets 
This Subpart focuses on assessing whether it is realistic to believe that 
the federal government might actively seek to regulate insurers’ uses of 
data. While insurance regulation has traditionally occurred at the state 
level, there are several reasons why it makes sense to look at the 
possibility of national reform. First, because insurers’ uses of data will 
pose the same problems across jurisdictions, a well-designed response at 
the national level would both ensure that all consumers are protected and 
prevent insurers that operate in several states from having to comply with 
radically different schemes. A centralized regulatory system would also 
 
 
 236. See discussion infra Part III.C.2. 
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alleviate state administrative agencies from having to locate and hire data 
science specialists, preventing an expensive duplication of efforts. Second, 
as a pragmatic matter, assessing the plausibility of reform occurring in all 
fifty states is a task that is well beyond the scope of this Article. Finally, 
which governmental body is discussed is, to a certain extent, of secondary 
importance—states could always adopt the reforms developed in the 
following Subpart if the federal government fails to take action. 
Recently the federal government has begun to indicate that it has a 
strong interest in regulating private entities’ collection and use of data. At 
the beginning of 2014, the White House commissioned two reports on the 
state of Big Data.
237
 The first report—Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, 
Preserving Values—was authored by the Secretary of Commerce, the 
Director of the Office of Science & Technology Policy, and other senior 
members of the administration, and it discussed the impacts that the Big 
Data revolution will have on society.
238
 More specifically, it focused on 
examining “how big data will transform the way we live and work and 
alter the relationships between government, citizens, businesses, and 
consumers.”239 The second study—Big Data and Privacy: A 
Technological Perspective—focused on a significantly narrower issue. 
Written by the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology (“PCAST”), it discussed “the nature of current technologies 
for managing and analyzing big data and for preserving privacy, . . . how 
those technologies are evolving, and . . . what the technological 
capabilities and trends imply for the design and enforcement of public 
policy intended to protect privacy in big-data contexts.”240  
These reports serve as clear indications that at least the executive 
branch of the federal government is cognizant of the problematic aspects 
of the evolution of data collection and analysis and is interested in 
exploring ways to combat these issues. After reviewing how Big Data 
practices have begun to permeate the public and private sectors, both 
papers made a number of policy recommendations about how the 
government can both foster the development of Big Data applications that 
benefit society as well as shield individuals from abusive practices.
241
 
While these reports identified some of the issues raised in Part II, other 
 
 
 237. See BIG DATA REPORT I, supra note 9; BIG DATA REPORT II, supra note 36. 
 238. See BIG DATA REPORT I, supra note 9. 
 239. See id. at iii. 
 240. See BIG DATA REPORT II, supra note 36, at v. 
 241. See BIG DATA REPORT I, supra note 9, at 58–68; BIG DATA REPORT II, supra note 36, at 47–
53. 
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problems, like how advanced analytics could harm consumer autonomy, 
slipped under their radar.
242
 
In addition to expressing interest in regulating private entities’ uses of 
consumer data, the national government has taken significant steps to 
expand its involvement in insurance markets over the past decade. Two of 
the most significant examples of this trend are the substantive health 
insurance requirements contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act
243
 and the provisions that created the Federal Insurance Office in 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
244
 
Further evidence of this trend is the recent attempt of a bipartisan group of 
senators to pass the National Insurance Act of 2007, a bill that would have 
authorized the creation of a federal insurance regulator.
245
 While the 
National Insurance Act was not enacted, its existence alone proves that 
federal legislators have some level of interest in granting a federal agency 
the power to regulate the insurance industry. 
2. The Key Components of Reform: Community Rating, Policy Content 
Review, and Prohibitions on Consumer Profiling  
If one were to assume that the federal government wanted to regulate 
insurance companies’ data practices, which reforms would best achieve its 
goal? First, recall that there are not compelling reasons to police insurers’ 
uses of data in the context of policies issued to commercial entities. The 
use of advanced data analytics in these markets will generate significant 
benefits without transgressing anti-discrimination, justice, and autonomy 
norms. Hence, federal regulation should be focused on lines of insurance 
that are sold to individual consumers. 
What types of rules should the federal government institute to best 
serve its citizens’ interests? As discussed in Part II, regulation should aim 
 
 
 242. The closest that either report comes to discussing the possibility of private entities regulating 
individuals’ conduct is identifying the possibility of Big Data enabling companies to discriminate 
against “unwanted groups” and engage in price discrimination. See BIG DATA REPORT I, supra note 9, 
at 53, 65. 
 243. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2014) (requiring individuals to carry health insurance); 26 U.S.C. 
§ 5000A (2014) (same). 
 244. See 31 U.S.C. § 313 (2014). Federal interest in regulating insurance markets can also be seen 
in the Federal Trade Commission’s efforts to ensure that insurers’ practices do not inappropriately 
burden low income citizens. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC to Examine Effects of Big 
Data on Low Income and Underserved Consumers at September Workshop (Apr. 11, 2014), available 
at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/04/ftc-examine-effects-big-data-low-income-
underserved-consumers.  
 245. See National Insurance Act of 2007, S. 40, 110th Cong. (2007), available at 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/s40. 
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to eliminate or minimize a number of harms, while preserving businesses’ 
capacities to innovate and reap benefits from advances in predictive power 
and actuarial fairness. Given that some of these values are at odds with 
others, the regulatory goal cannot be across the board maximization. 
Rather, a regulatory body must decide what the optimal balance of these 
values is and institute reforms that will help realize this balance. 
Because deciding the relative importance of values is an inherently 
norm-driven enterprise, individuals are likely to disagree about whether 
any proposed reform is desirable. Despite this, societal preferences are not 
entirely a black box. Existing regulations shed light on what society values 
and reflect the types of interventions that elected officials believe advance 
the public’s interests. Further, even without a fully fleshed out evaluative 
criterion, it is possible to identify regulatory approaches that could be 
easily calibrated to reflect different norms. 
Part II described three points in the insurance relationship where 
advances in data science could harm consumers. First, advanced analytics 
could affect consumers by influencing insurers’ underwriting and pricing 
decisions. Second, it could cause insurers to change the scope and 
conditions they impose on coverage. Third, the claims handling practices 
of data-saturated insurance companies could be substantially different than 
the systems that are currently in place. 
The most effective way for the government to protect consumers from 
untoward underwriting practices would be to mandate community rating 
schemes for all consumer lines of insurance. Such schemes would limit 
insurers to analyzing an enumerated set of characteristics when making 
decisions about individuals’ insurability and premium rates. The qualities 
that insurers are permitted to consider would be designed to reflect the 
regulator’s desired balance of values and could be different for each line of 
insurance. If initial efforts fail to achieve the desired state of affairs, or if 
the regulator’s preferences change, the list of rating characteristics could 
be expanded or reduced. 
Such regulations would resemble the ACA rules controlling how health 
insurers are permitted to discriminate among customers. Instead of 
allowing insurers to discriminate on whatever grounds their internal 
analyses deemed relevant, the ACA rules heavily restrict their ability to 
take consumers’ characteristics into account when determining their 
premium rates.
246
 Furthermore, ACA provisions prohibit health insurers 
 
 
 246. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a) (2014) (mandating that health insurers’ rate setting formulas 
comply with certain community rating requirements). 
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from refusing to sell their products to an individual based on their 
knowledge about that person’s health—a radical change given how 
widespread the practice of denying insurance applications (or claims) due 
to preexisting conditions was in the past.
247
  
Both of these rules demonstrate how the state has already decided that 
consumer protection interests justify placing limitations on how private 
entities use data, as well as showcase the types of measures the 
government has elected to use. By stating that insurers can only take 
certain characteristics (e.g., age, smoking status, number of dependents) 
into consideration when setting premiums, the ACA’s rules effectively 
prevent insurers from burdening vulnerable classes and from engaging in 
arbitrary discrimination. The ACA’s provisions also limit the impact that 
insurers’ premium setting practices will have on individuals’ personal 
choices.
248
 Finally, these rules help preserve individuals’ privacy by 
drastically decreasing insurers’ incentives to gather large amounts of 
personal information. Since companies cannot use information outside of 
the enumerated categories to inform their pricing or underwriting 
decisions, they will realize little return on amounts spent collecting such 
data. 
The prohibition on denying coverage to those with certain health 
conditions advances similar interests. It directly protects an identified class 
of vulnerable individuals (those with serious health conditions) and 
ensures that insurers’ practices will not disadvantage individuals who 
suffer unlucky losses. Further, by assuring consumers that they will have 
access to private insurance plans, the rule allays worries that one’s 
personal choices will affect customers’ insurability and prevents such 
concerns from affecting individuals’ behaviors. This aspect of the ACA 
also furthers privacy interests by destroying the benefit that insurers used 
to gain by collecting information about preexisting conditions. 
An ACA-like community rating scheme for consumer insurance lines 
would generate similar benefits. For example, insurers issuing 
homeowner’s policies could be restricted to considering objective qualities 
of the building (e.g., square footage, construction materials), local 
property prices, regional variances in catastrophic risks, and the 
 
 
 247. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I) (2014) (prohibiting health insurers from refusing to sell health 
insurance to individuals); Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law—A Primer, 19 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 29, 51–52 (2012) (describing the operation of preexisting condition rules in health insurance 
markets). 
 248. Individuals’ choices as to their family size and smoking habits are the only two types of 
decisions that insurers can use as a basis for discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a) (2014). 
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applicant’s credit history.249 While such a short list of factors is probably 
unrealistic, limiting insurers to a set of criteria would temper insurers’ 
predictive capabilities in order to advance anti-discrimination, justice, and 
autonomy interests. Such a system would also drastically increase the 
state’s ability to monitor the effect that different pricing criteria have on 
classes of consumers.
250
 
The best way to address concerns about insurers changing the terms of 
coverage in their policies would be to strengthen authorization 
requirements for modifications to policy terms. Asserting control over the 
content of insurers’ policies is well-trodden ground in the world of 
insurance regulation. First, there are a large number of statutes and 
regulations mandating that policies contain certain terms—for example, 
state laws impose minimum coverage limits on auto polices
251
 and the 
ACA requires that health insurance plans include coverage for services it 
designates as “Essential Health Benefits.”252 Second, as noted previously, 
it is already the case that many states require insurers to submit proposed 
policy modifications to the state regulatory body prior to their use.  
As the data revolution gives insurers greater insight into how they 
could tailor their coverage terms to reduce risk, there will be an increased 
need for regulatory scrutiny of proposed changes. Existing mechanisms 
for monitoring such behaviors are regularly criticized for failing to police 
questionable insurer practices. Because insurers’ economic incentives to 
take advantage of data-derived insights will grow over time, the demands 
placed on these already inadequate mechanisms will increase. 
Concentrating regulatory authority in a single, well-funded body would 
ensure that the impact that policy changes would have on consumers is 
reviewed prior to their use. For instance, regulators could shut down 
attempts to require that policyholders install monitoring equipment on 
property as a condition to coverage if they found it to be overly 
detrimental to autonomy and privacy interests. 
 
 
 249. It is worth noting that recent studies have indicated that several criteria that were suspected of 
discriminating along racial and income dimensions do not, in fact, do so. See, e.g., FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, CREDIT-BASED INSURANCE SCORES: IMPACTS ON CONSUMERS OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
(2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/07/P044804FACTA_Report_Credit-Based_Insu 
rance_ Scores.pdf. 
 250. For instance, to the extent that any of the selected qualities correlate with a protected class or 
individuals who have been disadvantaged by luck, regulators would have the capability to determine 
whether the correlation is strong enough to merit excluding the quality or instituting some sort of 
corrective measure. 
 251. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-6-103 (2015). 
 252. See 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2014). 
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Finally, the best way to protect policyholders from harmful claims 
handling practices would be to create a set of standards prohibiting 
insurers from using personal data when processing claims. The primary 
concern here is that, absent constraints, insurance companies will use this 
data to make determinations about the likelihood that individuals’ claims 
are fraudulent or whether policyholders will accept settlement amounts 
that are less than they are entitled to. Society has already recognized the 
value of such standards—regulations setting forth claims handling 
principles already exist in several states.
253
 Instituting requirements 
through a single centralized authority would yield the benefits described 
earlier and would allow a regulator to establish rules that promote a 
particular balance of values. An example of such a principle would be a 
prohibition on claims handling departments using any information not 
directly related to a loss when deciding how to respond to a claim.  
These three regulatory approaches would give the state means for 
controlling the extent to which consumer insurance markets embody 
different values. It should be noted that the analysis in this Part has been 
exclusively concerned with discussing how governmental bodies could 
address the problems associated with insurers’ uses of data. Whether there 
should be global restrictions placed on how private entities gather, 
analyze, and use personal data are important, but separate, matters.
254
 
Insofar as the analysis set forth in this Article can be generalized outside 
of the insurance context, it suggests that regulation of commercial entities’ 
Big Data practices is likely merited, albeit less so than it is for insurance 
companies.  
CONCLUSION 
It is becoming increasingly clear that advances in data collection and 
analysis will have a revolutionary impact on society. Individuals, 
businesses, and governments have already begun to generate and make use 
of data in a panoply of innovative ways. As traditional practices are 
 
 
 253. See Victor Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Common-Sense Construction of Unfair Claims 
Settlement Statutes: Restoring the Good Faith in Bad Faith, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1477, 1487–94 (2009) 
(describing states’ claims handling standards). 
 254. See, e.g., Crawford & Schultz, supra note 3, at 121–28 (proposing regulation that would 
grant individuals procedural due process rights against private entities); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank 
Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014) 
(arguing that private entities should be required to disclose data and algorithms to consumers); Tene & 
Polenetsky, supra note 2, at 263–71; Nicolas P. Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in the Age of Big 
Data, 81 UMKC L. REV. 385, 405–13 (2012) (arguing in favor of regulating private entities’ ability to 
collect consumers’ health data). 
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replaced with information-centered approaches, it will be necessary to 
reevaluate whether existing regulatory structures will continue to 
effectively advance societal interests.  
The insurance industry is one sector that has the potential to change 
significantly. The nature of insurance products creates economic 
incentives for insurers to collect and analyze data that are more powerful 
than they are for other commercial entities. These incentives will compel 
insurers to adopt aggressive practices. As data collection and analysis 
costs plummet, the economic constraints that have kept insurers in check 
will be removed and these incentives will compel insurers to adopt 
aggressive data strategies.  
Improperly tailored regulation of insurance companies’ uses of data 
poses a significant threat to public welfare. The use of advanced analytics 
in this industry has the potential to generate both significant benefits and 
substantial harms. An overly restrictive regulatory system risks denying 
society the welfare gains associated with healthy insurance markets. An 
overly permissive system, on the other hand, could lead to insurers 
intruding on consumers’ liberties, destroying privacy, and harming other 
societal interests. 
While a laissez-faire approach appears to be merited when it comes to 
insurers’ uses of data in commercial lines of insurance, the state needs to 
take a more active role when it comes to policies issued to individual 
consumers. Within the latter context, regulation must attempt to control 
insurers’ uses of data in a way that strikes a balance between a number of 
different values. This will not be a simple task—the values that regulators 
need to take into account will often be at odds with one another and it will 
be difficult to forecast the effects that rules will have. In order to be 
comprehensive, regulation will have to address how insurers may use data 
when performing underwriting, rate setting, policy construction, and 
claims management functions. Community rating, authorization 
requirements for policy modifications, and claims handling standards are 
ideal regulatory mechanisms for constraining insurers’ behaviors, as the 
substantive content of these approaches can be tailored to effectuate a 
regulator’s vision of the values insurance markets should embody. 
Identifying these general approaches, however, is only the start of an 
answer to these regulatory challenges. In describing the potential problems 
raised by insurers’ uses of data and constructing a regulatory framework 
for addressing these issues, this Article raises as many questions as it 
answers. What factors should determine whether a certain type of 
coverage should fall within the consumer regulatory scheme? How should 
trade-offs between actuarial fairness and other goals be evaluated? What 
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qualities should be included in the community rating criteria? While there 
are aspects of these questions that could be resolved through analytic 
reasoning, others are inherently normative matters that a regulatory body 
would have to answer for itself. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
